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Abstract 
 State level bias crime legislation was passed throughout much of the United States 
over the last three decades. Beyond their prosecutorial or instrumental application, bias or 
hate crime laws serve an expressive or messaging function. This function is meant to 
promote societal cohesion through the rejection of hateful ideologies, as well as signal to 
attacked or marginalized members of communities that the government is directly 
addressing the effects of bias crime. As the number of reported hate crimes in the United 
States remains essentially level, it is of importance to assess how well the expressive 
function is performing. Following a background on the development, debate, and 
variation of bias or hate crime law, this project focuses on a content analysis of prominent 
state level media with the expectation that the expressive success of laws can be detected 
in bias crime coverage. It is found that bias crime related stories were featured with 
greater regularity in the states of Washington and Minnesota, which have passed 
extensive bias crime legislation. Bias crime related stories were far less prominent in 
South Carolina, which has no bias crime laws. The State of Wyoming, another state with 
no bias crime laws, displayed a surprisingly large amount of coverage, primarily as the 
result of the high-profile murder of Matthew Shepard in 1998.      
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
State level bias or hate crime legislation has enjoyed widespread passage over the 
last twenty-five years throughout the United States. It has been put in place to address 
and most often increase penalties for crimes that are “motivated, in whole or in part, by 
the offender’s bias against a race, religion, sexual orientation, ethnicity/national origin, or 
disability and are committed against persons, property, or society.” 1 The proliferation of 
bias crime laws in recent years has been in large part tied to increased public awareness 
of hate crimes and subsequently concern over such offenses.2 A dominant socio-political 
perspective on such acts emerged in the United States in the latter twentieth century 
based on the notion that crimes rooted in discrimination present a unique threat to our 
society. Consistently increasing amounts of advocates and politicians came to agree that 
hate or bias crime must be isolated and openly addressed in order to secure the kind of 
inclusive society that a majority of citizens deem ideal. Therefore, rather than simply 
wishing to effectively prosecute and perhaps eliminate crimes motivated by prejudicial 
ideologies, bias crime laws provide an example of a government’s wish to support 
diversity and foster a sense of societal cohesion. Most advocates of increasing 
punishment for bias-motivated crimes view the ability to “send a message to the larger 
community”3
                                                 
1 Definition as outlined by Federal Bureau of Investigation crime statistics found at: 
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/hc2009/methodology.html. Accessed on March 25, 2011. 
 as being a primary objective behind hate crime laws.  
2 Levin, J. & McDevitt, J. (2002). Hate Crimes Revisited: America’s War on Those Who Are Different. 
Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado. 
3 Phillips, N. D. (2009). The prosecution of hate crimes: the limitations of the hate crime typology. Journal 
of Interpersonal Violence 24, 5: 883-905.  
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Addressing effects that might possibly extend beyond the actual biased crime 
itself are by no means the only objective of hate crime laws. Hate crime laws “serve both 
expressive and instrumental functions.”4 Indeed, “societal harm,”5 in the form of 
community unrest or retaliatory crimes was a focus of the argument made by the state of 
Wisconsin in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court case that has essentially provided 
the framework for subsequent construction of bias crime laws and legislation. In a 
unanimous opinion Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that “the state’s desire to redress” these 
“perceived harms provides an adequate explanation for the penalty-enhancement 
provision.”6 However, concrete assessments of how well bias crime laws prevent the 
most direct instrumental harms of hate crimes can be difficult to achieve. The national 
totals of reported hate crimes over the last fifteen years have remained essentially level. 
There has been variation within individual states, but often this can be owed to changes in 
categorization or reporting procedures.7 States have also often had trouble applying hate 
crime laws to arrests and prosecutions, and theoretically an amount much smaller than the 
actual number of bias crimes that occur are reported each year.8 Additionally, there is a 
lack of uniformity of laws across states and inconsistencies in the way hate crimes are 
reported.9
                                                 
4 Bleich, E. (2007). Hate crime policy in Western Europe: responding to racist violence in Britain, 
Germany, and France. American Behavioral Scientist 51, 2: 149-165. 
 All of this adds up to the creation of very murky picture of ‘instrumental’ 
5 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U. S. 476, 488 (1993). 
6 Ibid. 
7 Statistics compiled at http://www.adl.org/combating_hate/HCSA_10year.asp. Accessed on March 25, 
2011. 
8 Dixon, L. & Ray, L. (2007). Current issues and developments in race hate crime. Probation Journal 54, 2: 
109-124. 
9 Phillips (2009). 
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success. Just looking at the instrumental outcomes can leave one asking what, if any, 
effect bias crime legislation is having.  
However, if we look at the more abstract and expressive goals so often mentioned 
in the advocacy of bias or hate crime legislation, perhaps a more satisfying assessment of 
effectiveness can be ascertained. Central to measuring the messaging effects of hate 
crime laws is the public’s perception of the hate crimes, bias crime legislation itself, and 
the issues, both socio-political and philosophical, that surround this area of law.  
Some direct public opinion data exist regarding how hate crime legislation is 
viewed. Still, polls attempting to glean a sense of how the public feels about hate crime 
and its prosecution are few and far between. This is particularly true at the state level, 
where one must look to more acutely analyze what difference hate crime legislation has 
since there is a great deal of variance between state laws. It is notable that when polling 
has been conducted in recent years a generally favorable view of hate crime legislation is 
expressed. For example, a May 2007 Gallup poll taken around the time that a Democratic 
Congress was first attempting to pass federal hate crime legislation that would include 
gender, sexual orientation, and gender identity as protected categories showed evidence 
of widespread public support for such a measure. The inclusion of the new protected 
categories was even supported by well over fifty percent of Republicans and self-
identified conservatives,10
                                                 
10 Found at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/27613/Public-Favors-Expansion-Hate-Crime-Law-Include-Sexual-
Orientation.aspx. Accessed on March 23, 2011.   
 which are the kinds of groups that have traditionally been 
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those most opposed to the existence of bias crime laws and their further expansion once 
in place.11
These results show that despite a consistently vocal opposition, the popularity of 
bias crime legislation is considerable and has possibly grown amongst the overall United 
States population in recent years. However, a poll like this does not indicate whether or 
not the relative popularity of hate crime laws has increased as a result of legislation being 
enacted. It does not tell us if the expressive message being sent through bias crime 
legislation is being significantly received.  
  
Less direct than public opinion, but perhaps a more readily available method of 
assessing public perception and the dissemination of the expressive goals of bias crime 
law at the state level, is the visibility and portrayal of these laws in the media. Therefore, 
it is of value to explore whether or not the passage of hate crime laws or bias crime 
legislation has an effect on how hate crime is handled by the media. Do states with a 
greater amount of hate crime laws and their populations place greater emphasis on the 
acknowledgment or awareness of hate crime after the passage of such laws, and is this 
reflected in the media? A major goal set forth by the proponents of bias crime legislation 
is the abstract notion of maintaining or increasing societal cohesion, but measuring 
something like societal cohesion is a difficult task and it is hard to imagine that it can be 
done clearly or conclusively. Seemingly, though, communities that expose, label, and 
address the issues that surround hate crimes in open public forums such as the media are 
making more direct attempts to eradicate the underlying ideologies that lead to such acts. 
                                                 
11 Soule, S. A. & Earl, J. (2001). The enactment of state-level hate crime law in the United States: intrastate 
and interstate factors. Sociological Perspectives 44, 3: 281-305. 
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Whether or not these dynamics are creating a more cohesive society is difficult to 
measure, but they reflect that the purported expressive goals of bias crime legislation are 
possibly taking hold.  
Thus, this piece will attempt to garner some sense of how bias or hate crime 
legislation might be moving expressive goals forward through a content analysis of local 
media. The first chapter will look at the emergence of hate crime as a widely used term 
and category relating to bias motivated criminal acts before moving on to analyzing 
issues relating to bias crime laws in the political, constitutional, and philosophical 
spheres. It will examine the arguments utilized by those who have and continue to argue 
for the enactment of laws aimed at hate crimes. A review of the Supreme Court case 
history regarding bias crime legislation will then be conducted in order to outline the 
constitutional debate surrounding these laws and ultimately their validation at the hands 
of the Court. I will touch on the political opposition to hate crime laws and the 
philosophical debate in the literature will be briefly covered.  All of this will provide a 
background for my original research on media coverage of hate crimes and bias crime 
legislation. It is material essential to comprehending how hate crime laws have emerged 
in the United States. Also, it is important in understanding why, when attached to an 
existing crime, a restriction or penalization of certain kinds of speech has been largely 
justified within this strongly liberal society or, in the case of some communities, why it 
has not. 
The second chapter will cover in greater detail the kind of laws that have been 
passed at both the federal and state levels. It will look at the variance between the types 
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of laws according to the distinction between these two levels, but more importantly it will 
describe the differences in how states have approached bias crime legislation. The second 
chapter will end by profiling the four states featured in this project’s research; 
Washington, Minnesota, South Carolina, and Wyoming.  
Finally, the third chapter will involve a content analysis of how the media in these 
four states above cover bias or hate crime and the issues that surround it. Initially, this 
will be helpful in simply determining whether or not measurements of the expressive 
effect of bias crime legislation can be found through looking at the media. If it does in 
fact yield data useful in this sense, then this piece will attempt to identify what kind of 
effect the expressive or messaging aspects of bias crime legislation have or have not had 
on the public in these four states.  
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Chapter 2: 
The Development and Debate of Bias Crime Legislation 
The aforementioned relationship between public awareness and concern regarding 
hate crime and an increase in bias crime legislation is made apparent when one considers 
that bias crimes have arguably been present throughout the history of the United States. 
Yet, only in the last three decades have laws directly addressing such crimes been 
created. Aggression directed towards individuals or groups based on their race, ethnicity, 
religious affiliation, sexuality, or any of the many other descriptive categories that exist 
in U.S. society is not a new phenomenon. The growing popularity of the term hate crime 
in recent decades was not a result of such crimes suddenly appearing. For instance, as far 
back as World War I the Federal Bureau of Investigation began focusing on the kind of 
crimes that what would come to be termed hate crime in response to the activities of the 
Ku Klux Klan.12 Of course, hate crimes did not suddenly appear around this time either. 
It can be argued that the entire history of the United States is filled with crimes that could 
be categorized as being based on bias or hate if contemporary standards were applied. 
This is particularly so in the case of relations between different racial or ethnic groups. 
When looking at the dynamics of slavery, the marginalization of an indigenous 
population, and large influxes of immigrant populations, one does not need to strain to 
uncover a history that was arguably populated with a much larger amount of crimes based 
on bias then we currently see.13
                                                 
12 Hate crime background accessed on March 25, 2011, found at: 
http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/investigate/civilrights/ hate_crimes/hate_crimes. 
 In fact, there is logic in speculating that there has been a 
reduction in bias crime since darker periods in U.S. race relations, and that this is perhaps 
13 Levin, J. & McDevitt, J. (2002).   
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related to a current focus throughout the United States on isolating and prosecuting these 
crimes.  
While the spread of the term hate or bias crime both politically and legally can 
superficially give the sign that such crimes have increased considerably in the last few 
decades, the opposite is perhaps the case. Essentially, political strides made by minority 
rights movements in the latter half of the twentieth century helped foster a more positive 
view of a pluralist society. Previously, rights movements were simply aimed at creating 
something that would even remotely resemble an equitable society for those beyond the 
white, male, straight and wealthy. Compared to objectives such as voting rights, or equal 
access to educational or employment opportunities, bias crime legislation represents a 
much more detailed and finely tailored approach to promoting equality and societal 
cohesion; an approach that is now more accessible due to the larger strides made in 
previous years.  
Still, while hate or bias crimes were by no means a new development in the years 
leading up to the passage of state level legislation, this is not to suggest that bias crime 
laws were merely the natural outgrowth of a progressing society. There were clear factors 
that acted as an impetus and influenced a perceived socio-political need to create hate 
crime laws. High profile crimes in the 1980s and 90s that victimized individuals and 
groups based on their descriptive characteristics prompted public officials in many U.S. 
states and at the federal level to take notice of what were now being called ‘hate’ 
crimes.14
                                                 
14 Ibid.   
 Additionally, many white separatist groups, such as neo-Nazi skinheads became 
more vocal, prominent, and their extremist presence entered the American 
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consciousness,15 even as such groups’ philosophies came nowhere near being relevant to 
mainstream debate. The kind of crime now being referred to with the prefix of ‘hate’ had 
not necessarily increased during this period, and the growing awareness of such hate 
groups did not necessarily imply a higher population of bigoted citizens. However, the 
continued existence of crimes and groups so “prevalent and vicious…especially after the 
elimination of Jim Crow, the massive civil rights struggle of the 1960s and the effective 
activism of the women’s movement”16 perhaps magnified their impact and created a 
greater sense of crisis. However, statistically speaking, crimes falling under the category 
of hate or bias have never accounted for anywhere near even one percent of total crime in 
any state since the FBI started compiling hate crime statistics in the early 1990s.17
The statistical reality of hate crime and the amount of total crime it accounts for 
serves to highlight that a major component, if not the major drive, of bias crime 
legislation is based on the notion that the main effects of hate crimes are largely abstract. 
Advocates of increasing punishment for bias-motivated crimes view the ability to “send a 
message to the larger community”
  
18 as being perhaps the main objective behind hate 
crime laws. In fact, some feel that even on the most directly instrumental levels that “the 
deterrent may potentially lie in the declaratory value of legislation rather than the 
enhanced penalty,”19
                                                 
15 Hate crime background accessed on March 25, 2011, found at: http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/ 
civilrights/hate_crimes/hate_crimes. 
 and the “expressive message of the laws, rather than their 
manipulation of behavioral incentives…is most effective in reducing the threat that bias 
16 Levin, J. and McDevitt, J. (2002). 
17 Uniform Crime Reports accessed on March 25, 2011, found at: http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr. 
18 Phillips, N. D. (2009). The prosecution of hate crimes: the limitations of the hate crime typology. Journal 
of Interpersonal Violence 24, 5: 883-905. Pg. 901. 
19 Iganski, P. (1999). Why make ‘hate’ a crime? Critical Social Policy 19, 3: 386-395. Pg. 388.  
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crimes hold.”20
The broader expressive nature of bias crime legislation is made further 
understandable when taking into account the claim that hate crimes have effects that 
theoretically extend beyond the initial victim. On their face, bias crime laws may appear 
as a disproportionate response when compared to the space they occupy in overall 
numbers. The proponents of bias crime legislation respond by pointing to the 
disproportionate impact of hate crimes. Hate crimes are undeniably small in number 
compared to the amount of similar crimes that have no ideological motivation, but “hate 
crimes are distinct from the same underlying crime because of the greater harms they 
inflict.”
 These laws are not simply a means to reduce crime, but even in regard to 
that objective the overriding message of bias crime legislation is seen as essential.  
21 They are acts that resonate well beyond the superficial boundaries of a singular 
act, and can lead to the marginalization of groups within a community. This is due to the 
perceived goals of those perpetrating hate or bias crime, in that their actions reflect 
“beliefs in their own groups’ superiority and the inferiority of the victims and the groups 
to which they belong.”22 Bias crimes are seen as “message crimes intended to intimidate 
the victim and the members of his or her shared community.”23
                                                 
20 Altman, A. (2001). The democratic legitimacy of bias crime law: public reason and the political process. 
Law and Philosophy 20, 2: 141-173. Pg. 170-171. 
 As a result, advocates 
feel the state has a compelling interest in punishment that exceeds the superficiality of the 
act, and a pointed counter-message should be sent at the prosecutorial level which will 
disseminate to the community as a whole. 
21 Iganski, P. (2001). Hate crimes hurt more. American Behavioral Scientist 45, 4: 626-638. Pg. 633.  
22 Saucier, D. A., Hockett, J. M., Zanotti, D. C., & Heffel, S. (2010). Effects of racism on perceptions and 
punishment of intra- and interracial crimes. Journal of Interpersonal Violence 25, 10: 1767-1784. Pg. 1768. 
23 Lim, H. A. (2009). Beyond the Immediate Victim: Understanding Hate Crimes as Message Crime. Hate 
Crimes Vol. 2: The Consequences of Hate Crime. Eds. Perry, B. & Iganski, P. Praeger Publishers: 
Westport, CT.  
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For instance, a rash of petty vandalism in a community that is seemingly random 
and destructive for its own sake, which happens to affect multiple Jewish owned 
businesses, would no doubt be a nuisance and would most likely make business owners 
fear for their property. However, if in that same community a synagogue was vandalized 
and defaced with the use of racially derogatory terms or symbols such as the swastika, 
even if only once, it would constitute a form of vandalism that effects a community more 
than multiple ideologically neutral acts of property destruction. Rather than affecting only 
those who directly have an interest in the property that is targeted, vandalism driven by 
bias serves to make every Jewish member of a community feel unwanted or threatened by 
the perpetrators of the crime. It is theoretically a crime with broader intentions and a 
broader impact. Subsequently, then, the approach to constructing laws that address bias 
crime would be based on the notion that ‘message crimes,’ as hate or bias crimes are so 
often labeled or framed,24
                                                 
24 Iganski, P. (2001). 
 require a response that is comparably impactful. Bias crime 
legislation as it relates to addressing the above scenario should serve to be an expression 
and the promotion of what is presumably the community majority’s wish for a sense of 
equality, cohesion, and the embracing of diversity. The Anti-Semitic viewpoints attached 
to the crime are shamed as a means of deterrence and a message sent to the Jewish 
members of a community that they receive the support of the population on the whole 
through this government action.  
    Virginia v. Black, 538 U. S. 343, (2003) In reference to cross burning in the opinion of the court written 
by Justice O’Connor, as well Justice Souter’s opinion of concurrence in part and dissention in part. 
    Lim, H. A. (2009). 
    Liberman, Michael “Hate Crime Laws: Punishment to Fit the Crime.” Dissent Magazine July, 8 2010.  
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Also greatly aided by the messaging of bias crime law, central to the notion of 
promoting societal cohesion, and mentioned in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in 
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, is the theoretical usefulness of bias crime law as a means to stop 
retaliatory action. Essentially, if a crime that is perceived as an attack on an entire group 
is effectively and openly prosecuted as such, it will help discourage members of the 
initially attacked group from engaging in similar acts, thus avoiding escalation and a 
possible larger community conflict. Such a dynamic between different racial, ethnic, and 
religious groups is seen as enough of a threat that ‘retaliatory’ hate crimes are often 
categorized separately by those researching bias motivated crime. Advocates for bias 
crime legislation contend that hate crime laws and their usage projects the image that the 
state and the community on the whole do not tolerate bias motivated crimes, and vigilante 
responses are therefore not the only avenue to justice.25
Indeed, the claims of the uniquely wide reaching and expressive nature of bias 
crimes often find their way into the wording of state level legislation, along with specific 
reference to the interest of the government in messaging through addressing hate crime. 
The State of Washington, which has enacted some of the most extensive bias crime 
legislation in the country, provides a great example of the focus on message. A 
Washington penalty enhancement law passed in 1993 addressing malicious harassment 
that is biased in nature opens by expressing concern that was increasingly prevalent in 
many states around that time. Basically, “that crimes and threats against persons because 
of their race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or 
  
                                                 
25 Levin and McDevitt (2002), Phillips (2009)  
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mental, physical, or sensory handicaps are serious and increasing.”26 It then goes on to 
make the disproportionate harm claim by stating that “the state interest in preventing 
crimes and threats motivated by bigotry and bias goes beyond the state interest in 
preventing other felonies or misdemeanors… or other crimes that are not motivated by 
hatred, bigotry, and bias, and that prosecution of those other crimes inadequately protects 
citizens from crimes and threats motivated by bigotry and bias.”27
Not every state has created a record quite as explicit in regard to making clear the 
reasoning and intention behind enacting bias crime legislation. For example, a search of 
the legislative record in Minnesota, a state that also has extensive hate crime laws, 
produces simply a straightforward cataloging of laws and their guidelines with no 
reference to the findings that led to their construction and passage. Still, it is very likely 
the Washington State Legislature is not alone in their reasoning and motivation, which 
perfectly illustrates the expressive and counter-messaging objectives of bias crime 
legislation. The bill opens with reference to the instrumental need to address a form of 
crime perceived as an increasing threat, but the majority of the record addresses the more 
 This bias crime law 
further addresses the history of both cross-burning and swastikas, and the message sent 
by the use of these symbols in an attempt to “create a reasonable fear of harm in the mind 
of…a particular person, the person's family or household members, or a particular 
group”(emphasis added). It is certainly reasonable to interpret the wording of this bill, 
and subsequently the Washington State Legislatures passage of the bill, just as much an 
expressive act as it could be deemed an instrumental one.    
                                                 
26 Washington State Law RCW 9A.36.078. Accessed on March 25, 2011, found at: 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/RCW.   
27 Ibid. 
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abstract and perhaps more theoretical harms of bias crime. All the while the Washington 
law conveys a tone that makes clear an interest in combating ideologies that serve to 
attack a community standard of inclusiveness and societal cohesion. Later, the research of 
this project will look specifically at the state of Washington in an attempt to garner a 
sense of what effect laws like the one related to malicious harassment might have had by 
analyzing local media.  
 Of course, a state’s interest in expressing distaste for hatefully motivated actions 
also must consider the reactions of an individual victim to bias crime. Beyond the effects 
that might possibly be felt by the larger community, arguments for bias crime law 
frequently cite that hate or bias crimes can also have greater impact on individuals as well 
as communities. Due to this ability to “inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims”28 
hate crimes have a further exceptional quality. It has been frequently argued that the 
psychological consequences for hate crime victims are more severe than those of non-
bias crime victims.29 A greater psychological harm is often owed to the relative random 
nature of hate crimes. Victims are selected due to their descriptive qualities. Thus, 
individuals find it more difficult to rationalize why they were attacked, and have 
relatively little recourse in regard to avoiding a situation or behavior in the future that 
might help them eliminate the possibility of being attacked again. Something inherent in 
the being of those attacked is what leads to their victimization, so victims feel a greater 
threat exists in the future.30
                                                 
28 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U. S. 476, 488 (1993). 
 Furthermore, hate crimes are more often reported as physical 
29 Levin and McDevitt (2002), Saucier, et. al (2010)  
30 Levin and McDevitt (2002), Lim (2009). Iganski, P. (2001) Hate crimes hurt more. American Behavioral 
Scientist 45, 2: 626-638. 
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attacks, as opposed to the more indirectly harming acts such as “property damage, 
vandalism, or arson.”31
Notably, some argue that the instituting of hate crime legislation has the potential 
to affect society in a manner opposite to what advocates purport. For example, Jacobs and 
Potter write of the possibility that societal cohesion or racial tension can be exacerbated 
by high profile hate crime prosecution, and the exclusion of certain groups in 
legislation.
 
32 This raises the possibility that in an attempt to embolden historically 
attacked groups through bias crime law, the civil rights of other citizens are perceived as 
being threatened. Furthermore, even some of those who support bias crime legislation 
feel that these sociological outcomes are largely speculative. For example, in regard to 
the psychological effect of hate crime, Iganski and Lagou admit that “much of the 
evidence for the supposed greater harm caused by hate crime has been equivocal.”33
Most often, when the arguments for hate crime laws are challenged it is primarily 
due to possible conflicts with speech rights and the First Amendment. Bias crime 
legislation is viewed as unconstitutional, and it amounts to what is essentially punishment 
for character traits or ‘thought crimes,’ and a slippery slope of threats to basic rights that 
outweighs any good it can be shown to create. In response, advocates of bias crime laws 
see such measures as addressing a rare situation that, like others throughout the course of 
United States jurisprudential history,
  
34
                                                 
31 Saucier, et. al. (2010). Pg. 1768. 
 appropriately finds justification for the limitation 
32 Jacobs, J. B. & Potter, K. (1998). Hate Crimes: Criminal Law and Identity Politics. New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
33 Iganski, P. & Lagou, S. (2009). How hate crimes hurt more: evidence from the British crime survey. 
Hate Crimes Vol. 2: The Consequences of Hate Crimes. Eds. Perry, B. & Iganski, P. Praeger Publishers: 
Westport, CT.   
34 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, Miller v. California, Ferber v. New York. 
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or suspension of First Amendment rights. The effects of bias motivated crimes are 
exceptional and require the kind of exceptional legislation that has been constructed by 
proponents and the majority of U. S. states. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court made 
clear in 1992, a law that seeks to criminalize merely hateful speech is not constitutional.35 
Hate for an individual or group based descriptive characteristics can only be an addition 
or enhancement to the punishment of an already existing crime.36
The relative youth of hate crime law means that the Supreme Court doesn’t have 
an especially long history when it comes to addressing the constitutionality of hate or bias 
crime legislation. However, it has been addressed multiple times by the Court and has 
resulted in a great deal of, if not complete, clarity in how such legislation can be 
constructed. For the most part the outcomes of Supreme Court cases in this area have 
favored those who support hate crime laws, even if the decisions by the court have 
required adjustments in the construction of such laws. Due to the momentum enjoyed by 
bias crime legislation advocates in constitutional jurisprudence, and the Supreme Court 
providing the technical legal framework for hate crime legislation, it is of value to review 
 This is justified 
because it is seen as essential to the vital interest of maintaining a peaceful and equitable 
society, and any limiting of speech in this context falls in line with that of prior 
jurisprudence. However, some don’t find the circumstance of bias crime to provide a 
reasonable exception to the First Amendment Rule and see it as a violation of free speech 
rights, regardless of its criminal association or sociological and political need.  
                                                 
35 R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul Minnesota, 505 U. S. 377 (1992). 
36 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U. S. 476 (1993). 
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the cases heard by the Supreme Court before moving on to the political and constitutional 
objections of its critics. 
 
Bias Crime Law and the Supreme Court 
The distinction between acceptable and unacceptable construction of bias crime 
laws was primarily outlined by the Supreme Court in the early 1990s in R. A. V. v. City of 
St. Paul, Minnesota and Wisconsin v. Mitchell, both of which focused on statutes 
involving hateful or biased actions, but resulted in decidedly different outcomes. These 
decisions would aid in creating a framework for the influx of legislation at the state level 
in the following years, particularly the Court’s decision in Mitchell. Statutes relating to 
the punishment of hate or bias motivated action, and laws hostile towards certain speech 
content would not be entirely struck down in light of the First Amendment. Rather, their 
constitutionality would hinge upon exactly where and how the element of speech was 
attached to said actions. Put simply, it was deemed unconstitutional in R. A. V.  to 
essentially create a crime based on an action of hateful or biased speech which, excluding 
the speech, would otherwise not constitute a crime. In Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the Supreme 
Court ruled that existing crimes, such as the physical assault at issue in the case, could 
fall subject to a greater penalty if motivated by bias or hate. A hateful or biased 
motivation could be used in a supplemental capacity when determining how to punish an 
existing crime. It was not punished in and of itself, as was the case in R. A. V.  Also, the 
distinction drawn between the assault in Mitchell and other assault was based on the 
Court accepting the argument that the expressive nature of bias motivated crime made 
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such acts carry a greater weight than similar but ideologically neutral crimes. As a result, 
the state has a compelling interest and is constitutionally justified in punishing bias crime.      
Prior to R. A. V. the Supreme Court had struck down government statutes related 
to the limiting of hateful or racist speech despite such cases not directly addressing 
whether it was constitutional to institute hate speech or hate crime laws. In Brandenburg 
v. Ohio a leader of the Ku Klux Klan was arrested under an Ohio law aimed at criminal 
syndicalism for remarks he made directed toward racial minorities and the U.S. 
government. In a unanimous per curium opinion, the Court struck down the Ohio law and 
the subsequent arrest of Brandenburg. The opinion stated that the statute “as applied 
purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment assembly 
with others merely to advocate the described type of action.” As a result, the law fell 
“within the condemnation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”37 Different 
government actions aimed at the suppression of hate speech were taken up by the Court 
in Socialist Party v. Skokie when the city of Skokie, Illinois passed a series of ordinances 
as a means to block a planned march by a Neo-Nazi organization in a largely Jewish 
community. In another per curium opinion, a majority of the Court sided against 
government attempts to block speech, this time claiming that Skokie was essentially 
blocking speech before it actually even had the opportunity to occur.38
Neither of the preceding cases directly addressed a law that sought to criminalize 
hate speech. Still, both decisions give a fairly clear indication of where the Court would 
land regarding such statutes. If speech is not tied to any ‘imminent danger’ it cannot be 
  
                                                 
37 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 449 (1969). 
38 Socialist Party v. Skokie, 434 U. S. 1327 (1977).   
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curtailed merely based on its abstract advocacy of illegal action. Certainly, a message of 
intimidation or threat was meant to be sent to a certain group or groups in a community. 
This is particularly true in Skokie, where there was a blatantly pointed choice of venue for 
a Neo-Nazi march. However, the state could not usurp basic legal and constitutional 
rights in an attempt to quell disfavored speech. Theoretically, Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire had provided the basis for curtailing the speech of Brandenburg or the Neo-
Nazis if they were expressing themselves in a venue where it could be deemed ‘fighting 
words,’ but in both Brandenburg and Skokie the state was attempting to silence them 
before they ever got near that point.        
 While the Court handed down a unanimous decision in R. A. V. it is notable that it 
was split regarding the exact nature of what was problematic with the St. Paul ordinance 
which forbade “placing on private property a symbol, object, appellation, 
characterization, or graffiti…which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know 
arouses anger, alarm or resentment in other on basis of race, color, creed, religion, or 
gender.”39
                                                 
39 R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul Minnesota, 505 U. S. 377, 380 (1992). 
 St. Paul based a part of its defense of the ordinance on the notion that the 
actions it addressed amounted to “fighting words” as outlined by Chaplinsky. A five 
justice majority of the Court agreed that the actions described by the ordinance could fall 
under the concept of “fighting words,” but the law only covered certain kinds of ‘fighting 
words’. The majority found that “those who wish to use ‘fighting words’ in connection 
with other ideas…are not covered” and “the first Amendment does not permit St. Paul to 
impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored 
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subjects.”40 Further, even though the category of ‘fighting words’ falls outside of First 
Amendment protection, Justice Scalia wrote that this category is not “invisible” to the 
Constitution. Because it is not “invisible,” the constitution still protects against content-
based discrimination, even when that category might otherwise be regulated.41 In 
acknowledging that a focused limitation of particular kinds of speech might encounter 
content discrimination problems, St. Paul attempted to justify the ordinance by arguing 
that it served “compelling state interests.” The majority of the Court countered with the 
view that “an ordinance not limited to the favored topics…would have precisely the same 
beneficial effect,” and that “the only interest distinctively served by the content limitation 
is that of displaying the city council's special hostility towards the particular biases thus 
singled out.”42
A four justice minority concurred regarding the reversal of the Minnesota State 
Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the ordinance, but their reasoning was different than 
that of the majority. The concurring opinion written by Justice White takes issue with the 
majority’s insistence that an “all or nothing approach” is the only valid manner in which 
to restrict ‘fighting words.’ Justice White accuses the majority opinion of “characterizing 
fighting words as a form of debate,” and as a result, lending validity to “hate speech as a 
form of public debate.”
  
43
                                                 
40 R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U. S. 377, 391(1992).  
 The minority instead rested their objection to the St. Paul 
ordinance on overbreadth grounds. Essentially, these justices had no problem with the 
singling out of certain forms of speech under the ordinance, but found it 
41 Leeper, R. (2000). Keegstra and R. A. V.: a comparative of the Canadian and U.S. approaches to hate 
speech legislation. Communication Law and Policy 5, 3: 296-321. 
42 R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U. S. 377, 396 (1992). 
43 Ibid. 401, 402. 
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“unconstitutionally vague.”44
The split in reasoning of the Court’s decision in R. A. V. does not provide an 
example of a debate nearly as broad as that found in the strictly political world, or in the 
literature examining hate speech and bias crime law. Still, it does represent a slight 
glimpse into the general divide between those who feel it is constitutionally valid to 
legally discourage actions tied to what the majority of society deems hateful or divisive, 
and those who feel that virtually any attempt to single out certain types of speech, even 
with the best of intentions, creates a slippery slope that is prohibited by the First 
Amendment. The rejection of pure hate speech laws, along with the acceptance of bias 
crime legislation like penalty enhancements, shows that the Court has effectively taken a 
moderate position within this debate. 
 By rejecting the ‘all or nothing approach’ to ‘fighting 
words’ restriction, Justice White seems to be more sympathetic to the notion that the state 
has a reasonable interest in determining in some manner which kinds of ideologies it 
deems damaging to societal cohesion and community inclusion. Thus, he adopts a 
position more in line with those who have strongly advocated for the institution of bias 
crime provisions and the expressive objectives they embody.  
The Supreme Court later returned to the specific issue of cross burning in Virginia 
v. Black. In Black, a majority of the Court upheld the banning of cross burning as a form 
of intimidation, while striking down an element of the statue that would consider any 
cross burning as prima facie evidence of intimidation. This apparent split from the 
decision in R. A. V. was justified by claiming that the previous decision did not state “that 
the First Amendment prohibits all (italics original) forms of content-based discrimination 
                                                 
44 Ibid, 411. 
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within a proscribable area of speech,”45
The majority did appear to find a difference between the Virginia law and the St. 
Paul ordinance which related directly to objections raised in R. A. V. and presented a 
reason for separate consideration of the two laws in relation to the First Amendment. 
Still, a three person minority saw the decision in R. A. V. as implication that the Virginia 
law was also unconstitutional. Justice Souter wrote that “although the Virginia statue in 
issue…contains no…express ‘basis of’ (race, color, creed, religion, or gender) limitation 
on prohibited subject matter, the specific prohibition of cross burning with intent to 
intimidate selects a symbol with particular content from the field of all proscribable 
expression meant to intimidate.”
 and that “the Virginia law does not single out for 
opprobrium only that speech directed toward ‘one of the specified disfavored topics.’” Of 
course, the act of burning a cross as a form of intimidation is commonly known to be 
associated with a particular perspective or topic, but the all-encompassing nature of the 
Virginia statute was deemed by a majority of the Court as passing First Amendment 
muster where the more specific St. Paul ordinance in R. A. V. was seen as running afoul.  
46
The majority’s justification for holding in favor of a cross burning statue is by no 
means unreasonable, but it can still perhaps be viewed as a bit of a departure from the 
spirit of the decision a decade earlier in R. A. V. Certainly, that seems to be the opinion of 
Justice Souter’s dissent. By pulling on what could be considered a small thread separating 
 In essence, Justice Souter still saw the singling out of 
cross burning as representing the disfavored topic problem raised by the majority in R. A. 
V.  
                                                 
45 Virginia v. Black, 538 U. S. 343, 361 (2003) 
46 Ibid, 381. 
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Black from R. A. V. the Court was able to allow the state of Virginia to attempt to 
eliminate an activity which had historically been employed to invoke the “fear of 
violence” and “the disruption that fear engenders”47
As with Black, it is not inaccurate to perceive the decision in Wisconsin v. 
Mitchell as the Court finding a way to look at legislation related to hate speech with less 
skepticism than it did in R. A. V. However, there are important differences between the 
two cases that led to a unanimous Court, both in the decision and opinion of Mitchell. 
Perhaps the most important difference was that in R. A. V. and Black the Court was 
considering laws that essentially created a crime or illegal action, while Mitchell saw the 
state of Wisconsin attempting to add greater weight to a sentence imposed for an already 
proven criminal action. On this point, in the opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
he wrote that “the ordinance struck down in R. A. V. was explicitly directed at expression 
i.e., ‘speech’ or ‘messages,’ the statute in this case is aimed at conduct unprotected by the 
First Amendment.”
 within the American black 
population. Interestingly, this Virginia statute, undoubtedly aimed at signaling to the 
citizens of that state that the intimidation of black citizens would not be tolerated, 
survived a constitutional test because it never directly isolated that group or any group, 
for protection.               
48
                                                 
47 Ibid, 360. 
 This distinction is, of course, central to the line drawn between hate 
speech and hate crime laws. It was crucial in creating the framework for statutes passed 
in numerous states in the following years. The wish of states to message the need for 
tolerance and to attack divisive ideologies was made clearly constitutional if it was 
48 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993) 
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attached to already criminal actions. When hateful views are attached to conduct not 
protected by the First Amendment the government is given an opportunity to support 
favored viewpoints, because the laws passed have a more directly instrumental function. 
This is the case even if some of the instrumental functions mentioned by Justice 
Rehnquist such as “retaliatory crimes” or “community unrest”49
Mitchell argued that the Wisconsin penalty enhancement violated the First 
Amendment because it amounted to punishing someone for their bigoted viewpoint. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist responded to this argument by writing that “the First 
Amendment…does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of 
a crime or to prove motive or intent”
 are still often considered 
speculative.    
50 and “traditionally, sentencing judges have 
considered a wide variety of factors in addition to evidence bearing on guilt in 
determining what sentence to impose on a convicted defendant.”51 Mitchell also claimed 
that sentence enhancements like those found in the Wisconsin Statute fell prey to being 
overbroad and would create a ‘chilling effect’ regarding First Amendment and freedom 
of speech. Rehnquist responded that “the prospect of a citizen suppressing his bigoted 
beliefs for fear that evidence of such beliefs will be introduced against him at trial…is 
simply too speculative a hypothesis to support Mitchell’s overbreadth claim.”52
                                                 
49 Ibid, 488. 
 
50 Ibid, 489. 
51 Ibid, 485. 
52 Ibid, 489. 
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In 2000, the Supreme Court again heard a case involving bias crime penalty 
enhancement in Apprendi v. New Jersey.53 In Apprendi, the Court invalidated a New 
Jersey hate crime law, but this was due to the process that led to the penalty enhancement 
being employed. The facts that were utilized in giving Apprendi a harsher sentence were 
not submitted to a jury, but were rather based entirely on the determination of a judge in 
the case, which was deemed improper.54
The unanimous decision in Mitchell and its relative clarity has created a great deal 
more certainty for states when constructing sentence enhancement statutes than they 
enjoy when creating other kinds of laws that relate to hate speech, like those at issue in R. 
A. V. and Black. A great deal of hate crime legislation has been passed since the Mitchell 
decision and it has often been directly tailored to meeting the requirements found in the 
Wisconsin law and outlined in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion. Still, laws outside of 
the realm of penalty enhancement have not necessarily faced a great deal of opposition 
considering the less decided nature of the Supreme Court’s perspective. Notably, the 
ruling in R. A. V. only applied to that case, and although it was perhaps somewhat 
loosened in Black, it could theoretically still be applied to statutes in certain states that 
bear a greater similarity to the law in R. A. V.  than to Black’s Virginia statute.
 Therefore, nothing in the general acceptance of 
penalty enhancement provisions found in Mitchell was altered and it continued to stand 
as the definitive perspective of the Court on common hate crime laws.   
55
                                                 
53 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466 (2000). 
  
54 Epstein, L. & Walker, T. G. (2009). Constitutional Law for a Changing America: Rights, Liberties and 
Justice. CQ Press: Washington, D. C. Pg. 550. 
55 Levin, J. & McDevitt, J. (2002).  
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To use Washington State again as an example, a subsection in a Washington bias 
crime statute addresses cross burning by attaching the act specifically to the “property of 
a victim whom is or who the actor perceives to be of African American heritage.” At first 
this appears to be completely at odds with the requirements laid out by the Court in R. A. 
V. and Black. As a possible means to account for this, the law then goes on to say that this 
subsection “applies to the creation of a reasonable inference for evidentiary purposes” 
and thus “does not restrict the state's ability to prosecute a person under subsection 
(1)56… when the facts of a particular case do not fall within … this subsection.”57 This 
would appear to generalize the Washington law in a manner similar to the Virginia law in 
Black. However, the rest of the law does not cover “any persons or groups of persons,”58
                                                 
56 This references the broad categories covered by the law which includes race, color, religion, ancestry, 
national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensory handicap. 
 
but rather subsection (1) represents a laundry list of protected groups in a similar fashion 
as the St. Paul ordinance in R. A. V. The Washington State law that addresses cross 
burning has stood for almost two decades and likely will face little challenge in the 
future, even if R. A. V. can be applied to existing laws. The decision in Black also makes 
another dissection of cross burning statues seem unlikely. Still, looking at existing 
statutes such as the one in Washington serves to illustrate that the willingness to 
challenge laws related to hate speech and bias crime has perhaps waned since the early 
nineties. Essentially, the matter may be stalled in regard to challenges in the courts, even 
if some issues are not totally resolved.    
57 Washington State Law RCW 9A.36.080. Accessed on March 25, 2011, found at: http://apps.leg.wa.gov/.  
58 Virginia v. Black, 538 U. S. 343, 348 (2003). 
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The lack of challenge to laws that relate to hateful speech and bias crime has been 
prompted, at least in part, by the generally strong public support they have enjoyed, 
particularly following high profile cases such as the murders of James Byrd and Matthew 
Sheppard in the late 90s, and a growing public awareness and concern over such 
motivated crimes or actions in the last thirty years.59
 
 However, while the decision of the 
Supreme Court in Mitchell and the relative popularity of bias crime legislation may have 
slowed the challenge and reversal of such laws, it certainly has not put a stop to the 
debate surrounding it in the political, legal, and criminology fields. Both in relation to the 
effectiveness of the laws, and whether or not these laws unfairly punish the views of 
criminals, and are thus inherently unconstitutional as a violation of speech rights and the 
First Amendment. 
The Socio-Political Response of Critics 
 The rate at which the concept and categorization of hate crimes entered the 
American consciousness, and subsequently how quickly legislatures around the country 
moved to pass laws addressing them, is a testament to the overall popularity of such 
measures. Naturally, though, support has not and does not exist across the board. 
Objections to bias crime law and penalty enhancements have been a constant. Most 
states, after a sometimes lengthy political debate, have passed bias crime legislation and 
in following years increased its reach and detail, but opposition often remains. In a small 
minority of states like Arkansas Indiana, South Carolina, and Wyoming, opposition to 
hate crime legislation has dominated, and few, if any, laws targeting crimes of a biased 
                                                 
59 Levin and McDevitt (2002). 
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nature have been instituted. Any discussion of the justifications used to support bias 
crime legislation, both in regard to its instrumental and expressive functions, must 
include the views of those who see it as damaging. The arguments against hate or bias 
crime laws are varied, and deserve to be taken seriously. This is especially true of many 
constitutional objections that have and continue to be raised, despite the Supreme Court’s 
approval of bias crime laws, provided they follow the appropriate guidelines put forth in 
a number of cases over the last twenty years. 
 As was briefly mentioned previously, some feel that the cohesive societal impact 
so consistently trumpeted by advocates of bias crime legislation, and even sometimes 
accepted by those who oppose it on other grounds,60 is a myth.61 Instead of creating a 
greater sense of inclusion in a society and making its members progressively less 
comfortable with ideologies that lead to bias crime, hate crime laws will make many 
citizens resentful of those protected. A claim along these lines is sometimes backed by 
referencing the small statistical sum that bias crimes account for in overall numbers. 
Essentially, the emphasis placed on hate crimes in the last three decades has been blown 
out of proportion relative to the amount of hate crime that actually exists.62
                                                 
60 Hurd, H. M. (2001). Why liberals should hate “hate crime legislation.” Law and Philosophy 20, 2: 215-
232.  
 Due to this, 
rather than quelling tensions between societal groups, the advocates of bias crime 
legislation run the risk of creating greater divisiveness. Naturally, this argument also 
relies on either the downplaying or complete rejection of the notion that bias crime has a 
broader or more substantial impact and that “hate crimes are less severe; victims of 
61 Jacobs and Potter. (1998). 
62 Kopel, D. (2003) “Hate Crime Laws: Dangerous and Divisive.” Paper for the Independence Institute. 
Golden, Colorado. Found on April 4, 2011 at: http://www.i2i.org/ 
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various crime types suffer approximately the same psychological injury.”63 This claim 
has at times been helped along by advocates of bias crime legislation when they make the 
argument that the ‘message’ element of the laws are worthwhile even if no lessening of 
greater harm, a reduction in number of crimes, or the increasing of societal cohesion can 
be empirically proven.64
 This widely used rhetorical argument against bias or hate crime legislation, that 
rather than these laws creating a more inclusive or equitable society they actually serve to 
unequally protect one group or class in the population, is often combined with the 
accusation that prosecuting bias crimes separately from similar ideologically neutral 
crimes unfairly punish the thoughts or feelings of an individual. For example, in 2009, 
future Speaker of the House John Boehner opposed federal hate crime legislation aimed 
at protecting citizens based on sexual orientation referring to it as “thought crimes 
legislation” that “places a higher value on some lives than others.”
 Basically, in an attempt to reinforce or embolden the value of 
hate crime laws by referencing their theoretical usefulness as abstract messaging tools, 
advocates have sometimes made other arguments look a bit disingenuous.  
65 Boehner went on to 
say that he and other “Republicans believe that all lives are created equal, and should be 
defended with equal vigilance,”66
                                                 
63 Ibid. Pg. 6 
 implying that a penalty enhancement in response to 
crime directed at someone based on their sexual orientation would entail weaker 
prosecution for others. Such rhetorically heated opposition is by no means exclusive to 
64 Kahan, D. M. (2001). Two liberal fallacies in the hate crime debate. Law and Philosophy 20, 2: 175-193. 
Pg. 184. 
65 Montopoli, Brian. “Why GOP Leader Opposes Hate Crimes Protection for Gays.” October 13, 2009. 
Found on April 4, 2011 at: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-5381671-503544.html.  
66 Ibid. 
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purely political figures. Academics such as Jacobs and Potter make similar, if somewhat 
more sophisticated claims by saying that bias crime laws essentially amount to “thought 
crime” because they “provide extra punishment based on the offender’s politically 
incorrect opinions and viewpoints.”67 Rather dramatically, Nearpass even goes as far as 
to suggest that critics of this bias crime law have been labeled by the “politically correct 
movement” as “intolerant bigots,” which has contributed to the stifling of debate around 
the subject.68
It is of note that at the time of the preceding quotes by Rep. Boehner he did 
express support of existing federal bias crime protections due to a claim that those groups 
protected outside of sexual orientation or gender identity possessed immutable 
characteristics. This position highlights that many who may have generally taken issue 
with any bias crime legislation in the past have perhaps come to accept its presence in 
some forms after two decades of debate and momentum in favor of hate crime measures. 
It also provides an example of the greater amount of contention that still exists 
surrounding the validity of sexual orientation or gender identity as being protected 
categories in bias crime legislation. This is due to a somewhat frequent, and often 
religious, perception that those who fall into this categorization have essentially made a 
lifestyle choice, and it is not an immutable characteristic like those found in other hate 
crime protected categories. A more fervent and widespread opposition to gay, lesbian, 
bisexual, and transgender civil rights amongst American conservatives has also made 
conservative politicians fearful of measures covering these groups. Invoking a ‘chilling 
 
                                                 
67 Jacobs and Potter (1998) 
68 Nearpass, G. R. (2003). The overlooked constitutional objection and practical concerns to penalty 
enhancement provisions of hate crime legislation. Albany Law Review 66: 547-573. Pg. 554.  
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effect’ argument similar to that employed by Mitchell in Wisconsin v. Mitchell when 
speaking about the federal hate crime act passed in 2009 Indiana Representative Mike 
Pence remarked that “the measure could inhibit freedom of speech and deter religious 
leaders from discussing their views on homosexuality for fear that those publicly 
expressed views might be linked to later assaults.”69
A more extreme example of this kind of opposition could be found in South 
Carolina in the late 1990s which marked the period of time that state came closest to 
passing comprehensive bias crime legislation. A proposed bill that would have increased 
penalties for crimes committed against some one because of their race, ethnicity, sexual 
orientation or gender was referred to by Charleston area Rep. John Graham Altman III as 
a “pedophile protection bill.”
   
70 Altman reasoned that the bill meant “If a pedophile 
molested his granddaughter, and Altman referred to the pedophile as a pervert while 
hitting him, Altman said he would receive a stiffer penalty for his revenge under this 
legislation.”71
    A less politically charged and perhaps more nuanced position that is somewhat 
similar to the one displayed in the quotes from Rep. Boehner makes the claim that all 
crimes are hate crimes. It should not matter whether or not a crime is motivated 
ideological hatred of a victim or victims based on their descriptive characteristics. As a 
result of hate crime laws, certain groups receive, unfairly, larger amounts of protection, 
and certain criminals receive greater punishment. If there is no alternate rationale for 
   
                                                 
69 Hulse, Carl. “House Votes to Expand Hate Crime Definition.” New York Times, October 8, 2009, Sec. 
A1. 
70 Graves, Rachel. “Altman Scorns Hate Bill.” The Charleston Post and Courier, March 31, 1999.  
71 Ibid. 
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prosecuting some people to a greater extent than others for the same crime, other than it 
being based on who is victimized, a situation arises where different offenders charged 
with essentially the same offence are treated unequally under the law. The character of 
two criminals who have committed alike crimes is being what is being assessed and this 
goes beyond a conventional consideration of facts in the criminal case. These variations 
of critique have led to bias crime legislation being attacked on First Amendment, due 
process, and equal protection grounds.72
The decisions by the Supreme Court in Mitchell and Black undoubtedly took 
some of the wind out of the sails of those who oppose bias crime legislation on 
constitutional grounds. Still, a considerable community of critics continue to attack these 
laws on grounds that are of a much greater depth than the arguments so often employed 
by conservative politicians. This can often cause the debate to veer onto philosophical 
ground and confront the question of whether or not hate crime laws have a place in liberal 
societies like the United States.  
 It is generally the more articulate arguments 
against bias crime legislation that maintain a focus on the constitution. While political 
actors will sometimes invoke the constitution, it is often done in a vague fashion. 
Whether supporting or opposing bias crime laws their positions often remain lodged 
within a heated rhetorical framework established by civil or minority rights battles.  
  
 
 
 
                                                 
72 Nearpass, G. R. (2003). 
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Further Debate in the Literature 
Surrounding Bias Crime Law 
While not being the only approach taken towards invalidating hate crime laws, it 
is made clear through the case history, that the arguments against bias crime laws and 
legislation are primarily based in the perspective that they constitute a violation of the 
First Amendment.73
Understandably, the oppositionist position in relation to bias crime laws is made 
more complicated than opposition to hate speech regulation because it is attached to 
 In this view, pure hate speech laws are clearly unconstitutional. The 
federal and state governments cannot engage in favoring the content of certain forms of 
speech over others, at least not to the point of criminalizing speech, no matter how 
abhorrent it may be. This was basically the position adopted by the majority of the Court 
R. A. V. v. St. Paul, Minnesota and it effectively eliminated the possibility of hate speech 
laws like those often found in other western democracies. Despite the Supreme Court’s 
acceptance of penalty enhancements in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, when hateful speech or 
motivation is attached to existing criminal conduct some still find bias crime laws just as 
constitutionally objectionable as hate speech laws. Even if the Court has developed the 
jurisprudential reasoning with which to justify punishing bias motivation in crime, critics 
of these laws still feel that such a justification conflicts with the liberal spirit of the First 
Amendment. 
                                                 
73 However, the First Amendment approach is not the only one employed in attempting to invalidate hate 
crime laws. For example, Nearpass (2003) takes what could be deemed a more novel stab at arguing against 
penalty enhancements by using the Fifth Amendment and the double jeopardy clause. Others constitutional 
objections to bias crime legislation have taken up due process and equal protection, such as Apprendi. Still, 
the opposition has most often been centered on the First Amendment. Certainly, the perspectives this piece 
will measure through the media whether Neutral, Positive, or Negative revolve around the First.    
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something already widely accepted as prosecutable. First Amendment jurisprudence 
provides plenty of evidence that, given the proper circumstances, speech can be curtailed 
or prosecuted and some content is threatening enough to warrant suppression. For 
example, this can be seen in the outlining of ‘fighting words’ in Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire,74 as well as Miller v. California giving states the ability to develop 
community standards as they relate to obscenity,75 or New York v. Ferber allowing for 
exceptional broadness in the creation of child pornography laws.76
Many of the constitutional arguments in Mitchell and R. A. V. that opposed bias 
crime laws can still be seen in the contemporary political and academic rhetoric. 
Conservative and classically liberal figures still claim that these laws have a ‘chilling 
effect’ on speech, allowing the state to create favored categories of speech and punish 
other forms, and entail the punishment of thoughts character traits. Such objections have 
not been completely abandoned, but arguments have understandably been modified in 
order to find new angles of critique. In the years following Mitchell, some of those 
opposed to hate or bias crime legislation have focused on framing these laws as 
extraordinary in their attack on the ideas, thoughts, or the character of the accused in bias 
crime cases. An attempt has been made to draw a line between the constitutional and 
 The Supreme Court 
has determined that bias crime represents a First Amendment exception similar to the 
actions at issue in these cases. The Court decided in Mitchell that the speech element 
within bias crime law can justifiably result in a penalty enhancement because it 
contributes to a relevant threat beyond the act itself.  
                                                 
74 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942). 
75 Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973). 
76 New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747 (1982).  
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legal exceptions that were made as a result of the circumstances at issue in cases like 
Chaplinsky, Miller, and Ferber and those exceptions inherent in hate crime laws.  
Hurd adopts such an argument, at times quite compellingly, by claiming that bias 
crimes are prosecuted in a novel fashion from other crimes. She contends that hate and 
bias crime legislation “has worked important changes in both our criminal law doctrine 
and our political presuppositions” and that “no longer is character immune from criminal 
sanction; no longer is virtue and vice outside the scope of state action.”77 Hurd feels that 
an approach to criminal prosecution has taken on a uniquely normative quality within 
bias crime legislation; a normative quality in her view not found in previous legal 
precedence. She delves into a social philosophical realm by comparing the use of bias 
crime laws as a piece of a “perfectionist agenda,” warning that legislators “must be 
confident that in enacting such legislation, they are not inhibiting the liberty to be bad 
that is necessary to the cultivation of good.”78 Hurd is sympathetic to the stated goals of 
bias crime legislation, but still seems to feel there is a real possibility that it can have the 
effect of suppressing valuable public debate, much in the same way that the criminalizing 
of simple hate speech would theoretically lead to the reduction of valuable public 
dialogue. Hurd concludes her argument against bias crime legislation by warning that, 
while the results of bias crime laws will likely fall in line with commonly held values, a 
burden remains with the state to “assure us that they will exercise only what is 
diseased.”79
                                                 
77 Hurd, H. M. (2001). Pg. 232. 
  
78 Ibid. Pg. 231. 
79 Ibid. Pg. 232. 
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These legal and philosophical critiques are not wildly off-base or irrational like 
much of the more politically driven opposition can be. There is undoubtedly a normative 
component to the existence and construction of bias crime legislation. It is inherent in its 
speculative expressive function. The question then becomes: is this normative element 
especially unique and perhaps more importantly, a serious threat to the legal and 
constitutional rights of United States citizens? Kahan counters Hurd by acknowledging 
that while one can make the argument that it is “wrong to view the values expressed by 
hate crimes as any worse than those involved in other types of crimes,” critics have no 
basis for the claim that “hate crime laws are bad because they take values into account in 
a way that the rest of the law does not.”80 He sees the role that values and assessing harm 
play in bias crime legislation as being little different than that at work in “homicide 
gradations, rape law, capital sentencing provisions, and a host of other doctrines.”81 The 
line drawn between bias and other crimes, and the attack on the normative quality of bias 
crime law, is owed, according to Kahan, to the norms informing bias crime being 
“nontraditional and contested.”82 Ultimately, he sees the normal framework for debate 
being skewed by an adherence to “orthodox liberal theory,” and that the “legitimacy of 
such laws” should not depend “on whether they deter harms independent of the state’s 
aversion to hate criminals’ noxious ideologies.”83
                                                 
80 Kahan, D. M. (2001). Pg. 183. 
 In Kahan’s view, the idea that other 
areas of criminal law have fallen within these guidelines is inaccurate.   
81 Ibid. Pg. 192. 
82 Ibid. Pg.  
83 Ibid. Pg.  
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 The view of Altman perhaps lands somewhere in the middle of Kahan and Hurd. 
Like Kahan, he feels that the debate surrounding bias crime laws is generally flawed; that 
the “vision of a clear and simple answer to the issue” of hate crime legislation is 
“illusory.”84 In what could be deemed at least minor agreement with many of the critics 
of bias crime laws, Altman does acknowledge that they infringe on the principle of 
freedom of thought. Employing the philosophical concept of ‘public reason’ he argues 
that bias crime laws most appropriately find justification in the need for equitable 
citizenship. Some, of course, argue that the opposite is the result of bias crime legislation 
and these laws actually damage the ability to realize such a goal because they isolate 
certain groups for protection.  Altman counters this by writing that “if we lived in a social 
world where individuals were not vulnerable to second-class status on account of such 
factors as race, gender, and sexual orientation, then bias crimes might still exist but they 
would not contribute to…systematic consequences.”85
 Altman’s approach ultimately reads as a very eloquent articulation of the 
expressive and instrumental goals invoked by many advocates with, perhaps, the added 
benefit of a more reasonable acknowledgement that the liberal First Amendment values 
that hate crime laws encounter cannot be easily shrugged off. The philosophical 
 However, that is not the reality. 
From the perspective of public reason it is acceptable to attempt to get from here to there 
by employing bias crime protections along the lines which now exist. If American society 
were at a more equitable point the fear of traditionally marginalized groups becoming 
favored would perhaps be relevant. As it stands now such a concern is largely unfounded.   
                                                 
84 Altman, A. (2001). Pg. 173. 
85 Ibid. Pg. 171. 
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reasoning as laid out by Altman and Kahan, along with the constitutional arguments that 
have proved persuasive in prominent Supreme Court cases, and the political advocacy 
both in the literature and on the part of politicians have all provided the groundwork for 
the passage of many hate crime statutes in a clear majority of states. Their passage has 
also understandably coincided with a general popularity amongst the citizens of these 
states. Undoubtedly, despite some persistent objections, bias crime legislation has 
become a part of our liberal society and it is hard to imagine it will be successfully 
removed from the many states that employ it, or at the federal level. Still, how successful 
has bias crime legislation been, or, more central to this piece, how effective have the 
expressive or messaging aspects of hate crime laws been? Once the laws are passed, are 
hate crimes more openly and frequently addressed, and are bias crime laws viewed by the 
public as an effective and successful means of government fostering a more equitable and 
cohesive society? Most central to this piece is the question of whether or not this is 
reflected and can be measured by looking at the media.  
Before moving on to the research pertaining to the state level which will address 
these questions, it is of value to review how they vary in their approach to bias crime 
legislation and examine why these variations exist. Every state has approached the 
construction of bias crime laws in at least somewhat unique fashion, and a few state 
legislatures have avoided the creation of such laws altogether. Special attention will be 
paid to the four states of Washington, Minnesota, South Carolina, and Wyoming. The 
states featured in the subsequent content analysis.     
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Chapter 3: 
Bias Crime Laws and Their Variations at the State Level  
Every state is subject to some bias crime legislation due to its passage at the 
federal level. However, this means that the resulting laws only apply to crimes that fall 
under federal jurisdiction, which leaves out a considerable majority of offenses. The first 
major piece of legislation related to hate crimes passed at the federal level was the widely 
supported Hate Crime Statistics Act enacted by the 101st Congress. This bill required the 
Justice Department to compile and publish statistics regarding crimes based on race, 
religion, sexual orientation, and ethnicity. National origin, gender, and disability were 
added as statistical categories in 1994 with passage of the Hate Crime Sentencing Act 
which also increased penalties for bias motivated crimes committed in national parks and 
on other federal property. It would take another fifteen years for another major piece of 
legislation directly aimed at bias crime to pass. Still, in the intervening years laws that 
bore some relationship to hate crime were passed, such as a 1994 Violence Against 
Women Act, and legislation increasing federal jurisdiction and increased penalties for 
church burnings.86
 In 2009, after roughly a decade of attempts to expand federal hate crime laws, the 
Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Hate Crimes Prevention Act was passed as an 
attachment to a Defense Department authorization bill. This latest piece of federal bias 
crime legislation expanded to the prosecution of crimes based on the victim’s actual or 
perceived sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, or disability. It also increased the 
 
                                                 
86 Timelines and other material found at the Anti-Defamation League website http://www.adl.org and the 
Human Rights Campaign website http://www.hrc.org. Accessed on April 5, 2011. 
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ability of federal authorities to intercede in states with limited bias crime laws. 
Additionally, it provided greater federal resources for local law enforcement in the area 
of hate crimes.87
The kind of bias motivated acts legally targeted outside of federal jurisdiction 
varies from state to state. The broad descriptive categories most often covered by bias 
crime statutes and penalty enhancements are race, ethnicity, and religious affiliation. 
Currently forty-five states and the District of Columbia cover these groups with bias 
crime measures. Less prominent are statutes aimed at punishing crimes as they relate to 
sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, and mental, physical, or sensory disabilities. 
However, increasingly, these latter categories have been addressed and many of them are 
covered by a majority of states. For example, thirty-two states increase penalties for 
crimes aimed at sexual orientation. Thirty-two also include disability, and twenty-eight 
states count gender as a protected category. 
 Despite the expanded federal capabilities of the federal government put 
in place with the 2009 Hate Crimes Prevention Act, avenues available for addressing bias 
crime in states with few or no laws remain very limited. Like much criminal law, the 
emphasis and prosecution of bias crimes is still primarily handled at the state and local 
levels.          
88
There are also varied forms of laws that are aimed at protecting these groups from 
hate crimes and highlighting such crimes when they occur. Not surprisingly, the most 
common of these are penalty enhancement provisions for bias crimes similar to the law at 
issue in Wisconsin v. Mitchell which the Supreme Court found to be decidedly 
    
                                                 
87 Ibid. 
88 http://www.adl.org/99hatecrime/state_hate_crime_laws.pdf. Accessed on April 5, 2011. 
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constitutional. Forty-five states and D.C. have penalty enhancements for bias motivated 
crimes. As noted above, all of the states with penalty enhancements address crimes 
relating to race, ethnicity, and religious affiliation, but vary according to other categories. 
The type of crimes that the penalty enhancements are applied to range from assault or 
malicious harassment to bias motivated acts of vandalism and property damage. Within 
this latter category, many states have created laws that directly address bias crime based 
on religious affiliation by fashioning statutes that criminalize interference with, 
vandalizing, or damaging places of religious worship. This can also serve to protect 
places of worship in their capacity as community centers or rallying points which have 
often been subject to attack based more on racial associations than religious ones.89
 Many states, as diverse as Connecticut, Florida, and Washington have specifically 
associated the burning of crosses with criminal action. However, the way in which the 
use of symbols is criminalized can vary. In Connecticut the use of a burning cross is 
deemed prosecutable as a “deprivation of rights” through the “desecration of property.”
  
90 
This law covers public property and private property without the written consent of the 
owner, thus leaving the kind of private cross burning activity at issue in Virginia v. Black 
theoretically legal in Connecticut. In Washington the burning of crosses is categorized as 
a form of malicious harassment, or essentially a form of intimidation, which makes it 
similar to the kind of regulation in the Virginia law at issue in Black.91
Laws providing easier access to procedures for the filing of civil actions against 
the perpetrators of hate crime are also a frequent form of legislation existing in thirty-two 
   
                                                 
89 Ibid. 
90 Chapter 814c, Section 46a-58.  
91 Washington State Law RCW 9A.36.080. 
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states and D. C. A common example of such a statute can be found in Minnesota, which 
states that “a person who is damaged by a bias offense has a civil cause of action against 
the person who committed the offense. The plaintiff is entitled to recover the greater of: 
(1) $500; or (2) actual general and special damages, including damages for emotional 
distress.”92
Another form of hate crime statute seen in just over half of U. S. states involves 
mandating the collection of data on bias motivated crimes. However, the kind of data 
collected can vary from state to state. For instance, out of the twenty-eight states with 
data collection statutes only sixteen require collecting sexual orientation centered hate 
crime data, and only twelve collect data on hate crimes involving gender. Again, using 
Minnesota as an example, these kinds of measures entail that “a peace officer must 
report…every violation…if the officer has reason to believe, or if the victim alleges, that 
the offender was motivated to commit the act by the victim's race, religion, national 
origin, sex, age, disability, or characteristics identified as sexual orientation.”
  
93
                                                 
92 Minnesota statute 611A.79. 
 The 
Minnesota statute then goes on to require the detailed cataloging and recording of the 
biased crime. Beyond these data collection measures simply ensuring that an accurate 
tally of bias crimes is gathered, they theoretically motivate police officers to pay greater 
attention to the possible role of bias motivation in crime because it is required by law. 
This can aid in the state signaling to its citizens through more than political rhetoric that 
authorities are paying close attention to crimes that may go beyond the initial victim and 
indicate a pattern in the kind of ill treatment a particular group is receiving.  
93 Minnesota statute 626.5531. 
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Even more relevant to these objectives just mentioned, as well as making bias 
crime laws effective, but more rare than data collection legislation, are statues mandating 
or requiring law enforcement training in relation to hate or bias motivated crimes. In fact, 
only fourteen states, including two researched in this project (Washington and 
Minnesota), require such training. Naturally, training statutes are meant to provide police 
with the necessary tools to ensure that other hate crime laws, statutes, and measures are 
applied at the law enforcement level in the manner in which they are intended. In a state 
like Minnesota, training along these lines is even mandated, though not required, for 
prosecutors. Presumably, this is meant to maintain proper and efficient application of bias 
crime laws along their entire path from the street to the court room.  
Every state and the District of Columbia, with the exception of Wyoming, have 
some form of law that could be categorized as combating bias crime. Many states have 
passed an extensive collection of measures that cover a wide array of descriptive 
characteristics that can make individuals or groups subject to bias attack, while others 
have passed limited but significant legislation. A much smaller number of states have 
passed a handful of measures that can be stretched or construed as possibly related to bias 
crime. However, they are not utilized in this fashion, which makes their response to hate 
crime little different than that of Wyoming. South Carolina, Arkansas, Georgia, and 
Indiana could all be categorized in a similar manner to the one state with absolutely no 
hate crime related legislation. Being included in a category similar to Wyoming is 
appropriate due to these four states having no laws that create any kind of penalty 
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enhancement for bias offences, cover any specific group traditionally made the target of 
such crimes, or even mention bias or hate crime.   
Because of this the laws that can be somewhat related to hate crime in South 
Carolina, Arkansas, Georgia, and Indiana do little in a practical sense to allow the 
government to prosecute bias crime as such, and theoretically do even less in an 
expressive sense. For example, in South Carolina, one of the states featured in this 
project’s content analysis, bias crimes can be prosecuted, but under statutes that relate to 
a generic violation of civil or constitutional rights. Institutional vandalism such as the 
property destruction of churches and other places of worship is also covered in a general 
fashion.94
Elaborating on polar opposite states, such as Minnesota and South Carolina, is not 
meant to suggest that states either have vast amounts of hate crime legislation or virtually 
none. For instance, at first glance the state of Utah could perhaps be viewed as being on 
par with South Carolina, and the other states mentioned above with basically no laws but, 
while it only has one law related to bias crime, there is a notable distinction to be drawn. 
 Technically these laws could be used to combat what can be categorized as 
hate crime, and seemingly the passage of a law focused on church vandalizing provides 
some acknowledgment of a historically common form of hate crime. However, the laws 
never directly address bias crime as a concern, and there are certainly no penalty 
enhancements as a result of bias motivation. Even if a bias crime is prosecuted by the use 
of these laws it is never legally acknowledged as a bias or hate crime. There will 
therefore be no penalty enhancement, but perhaps more importantly, the declaratory 
value of the South Carolina laws is essentially nonexistent.    
                                                 
94 South Carolina Statutes 16-5-10, 16-17-560, 16-11-535, and 16-11-110. 
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The one bias crime statute in Utah was added to an existing law generically addressing 
constitutional and civil rights, but it directly addresses hate crime and also involves a 
penalty enhancement for multiple categories of descriptive targets.95
 
 These last two 
elements of the Utah law and its amendments remove the state from the category of those 
still largely resisting bias crime legislation, even without an amount of laws that matches 
the extensive coverage of many other states. More generally, what can be viewed as a 
sort of moderate approach to bias crime law is characterized by states with at least some 
legislation directly addressing bias crime, while at the same time having a limitation on 
the types of groups protected by laws. Moderate states might also have no requirement 
for data collection, they often lack of access to civil action procedures or damages as the 
result of a bias act, and frequently such states do not require training for police regarding 
hate crimes. 
Why Are There Variations? 
The reasons for a state like California having nineteen statutes that could be 
characterized as bias crime related96
                                                 
95 Utah Statute 76-3-203.3. 
 and a state like Wyoming having none cannot be 
explained by looking at any one factor. At the most superficial level it could appear as 
though an abundance or lack of bias crime legislation could be owed to the amount of 
bias crime a state is faced with. For example, according to the FBI, the amount of 
reported hate crimes in Wyoming rarely amounts to more than ten in a given year. 
96 http://www.partnersagainsthate.org/laws/list-of-hate-crime-laws.html?state=ca. Accessed on April 7, 
2011. 
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Further, the majority of reported hate crimes are still based on race or ethnicity.97 So, a 
state with a limited amount of diversity might not deal with a large amount of bias crime 
and not feel the need to create legislation accordingly. However, crimes that can 
reasonably be categorized as being based on hate or bias are certainly not exclusive to 
particular locations or communities in the United States. Therefore, it would seem a 
stretch to posit that legislative response is simply proportional to the amount of bias 
crime that a given state or community is likely to encounter. Largely due to immigration, 
communities are increasingly plural in their makeup, and certain categories such as 
gender, sexual orientation, or disability have really never been exclusive to certain 
geographical locations. Additionally, as standards vary by community, and it is possible 
that states resistant to legislation will underreport bias crime,98 numbers must often be 
taken with a grain of salt. Still, even with the numbers as they are, a brief glance at the 
amount of FBI-recorded incidents per year provides ample evidence that legislation and 
the relative threat of bias crime often do not coincide. For example, the number of bias 
crimes reported in South Carolina in 2008 was merely eleven fewer than the total in 
Minnesota, yet the latter state is a national leader in hate crime legislation and the former 
has passed none.99
The politics of a given state is another factor that readily presents itself as a 
possible determinant of why bias crime legislation is enacted. In fact, the dominant 
political climate or culture of a state does appear to have an effect on bias crime law 
   
                                                 
97 FBI Uniform Crime Reports, found at: http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr. Accessed on April 7, 
2011. 
98 King, R. D., Messner, S. F., & Baller, R. D. (2009). Contemporary hate crimes, law enforcement, and the 
legacy of racial violence. American Sociological Review 74: 291-315. 
99 FBI Uniform Crime Reports, found at: http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr. 
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passage. In a general sense, a glance at states with a large amount of bias crime 
legislation and those without does show certain trends relating to political ideology. The 
national popularity of bias crime legislation has ensured that widespread passage of laws 
has not occurred only in states like California, Minnesota, or Washington, which tend to 
skew towards more Democratic driven progressive politics, even if these were the states 
that pioneered the passing of hate crime laws. Indeed, some states with a more 
conservative political culture such as Texas and Nebraska have passed extensive hate 
crime legislation. However, those states with decidedly small amounts of bias crime laws 
or virtually none do tend to be politically conservative and generally have Republican-
dominated legislatures. This is not to imply that support or opposition always falls along 
party lines, but evidence suggests that they can work as an at least reasonably accurate 
predictor of support for bias crime legislation. In fact, previous research has found that 
the percentage of a state legislature that is Democratic has a strong statistical relationship 
to the adoption of hate crime legislation.100 Such an outcome is theorized as being most 
likely a result of the Democratic Party having a stronger political bond with, and 
generally acting more favorably toward, the minority groups that are most often the 
victims of bias crimes and thus the focus of bias crime laws.101
                                                 
100 Soule, S. A. & Earl, J. (2001). The enactment of state-level hate crime law in the United States: 
intrastate and interstate factors. Sociological Perspectives 44, 3: 281-305. 
 The party affiliation 
factor even proved to be a stronger indicator over time, perhaps as both parties 
101 Ibid. 
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increasingly solidified their position on a form of legislation that was relatively fresh 
when researchers first began looking at how it was affected by political parties.102
Another factor that has been found to be relevant to the passage of bias crime 
laws is past policy innovation, at least with the states that were at the forefront of passing 
extensive legislation. It has also been found that states that devote a large amount of 
media attention to hate crimes are more likely to pass hate crime legislation,
  
103 which is 
of particular relevance to this piece. If media coverage indicates a greater likelihood of 
passage, this same coverage would theoretically remain consistently high after passage 
when compared to media attention in communities with no laws. Further, it would 
perhaps even increase the amount of coverage, since bias crimes continue to occur at 
similar levels after the passage of legislation.104
The importance of media coverage in the creation of laws also lends evidence to 
the notion that in states where “the social problem of hate crime is most evident” laws are 
enacted at a higher rate.
 Attention directed at bias crime has been 
entrenched within the legal system, and this would be reflected in the media. 
105
                                                 
102 Jenness, V. & Grattet, R. (1996). The criminalization of hate: a comparison of structural and polity 
influences on the passage of “bias-crime” legislation in the United States. Sociological Perspectives 39, 1: 
129-154.   
 Thus, issue salience may have just as much, if not more, 
bearing on whether or not bias crime legislation is passed, and it often has little relation 
to how many bias crimes have occurred. Essentially, the amount of hate crimes reported 
statistically in a given year or over a period of time will very likely not have a profound 
effect on media reporting, but larger or more dramatic bias crimes can have a 
103 Soule & Earl (2001). 
104 FBI Uniform Crime Reports, found at: http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr. Accessed on April 5, 
2011. 
105 Ibid. Pg. 294. 
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disproportionate effect. It has been theorized that issue salience, media coverage, and the 
passage of hate crime laws is much more affected by ‘triggering’ events or high profile 
bias crimes rather than overall numbers.106
 
 Theorizing about the effects of ‘triggering’ 
crimes again provides an example of the expressive qualities surrounding both hate crime 
and the legislation meant to combat it. Smaller bias crimes can occur in large numbers 
but still not approach the message effects on the public consciousness of larger and 
generally more violent crimes. Seemingly, one high profile and well publicized hate 
crime has a more profound effect on how bias crime is handled politically than does 
many smaller bias crimes in aggregate. Subsequently, a high profile crime can create a 
sense of public urgency even if, in reality, bias crimes are not occurring with a great deal 
of frequency. Of course, the relationship between issue salience and media coverage is 
not exclusive to the area of bias crime, but it does appear to have been especially relevant 
to the promotion and successful passage of bias crime legislation in recent decades. The 
idea that issue salience is tied more to the perception of a mounting problem rather than 
the actual number of crimes is later looked at through a comparison of the research in this 
project regarding media coverage of bias crime and FBI statistics. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
106 Jenness & Grattet (1996). Pg. 148.  
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Chapter 4: 
Profiles of Content Analysis States 
Washington and Minnesota 
 The passage and character of bias crime legislation in the State of Washington has 
already been touched upon numerous times in this piece, but a little more background 
should be given before moving on to a content analysis of its media. Like many other 
relatively progressive states, Washington began to craft a series of bias crime measures in 
the early 1990’s around the time the Supreme Court cases of R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 
Minnesota and Wisconsin v. Mitchell helped to provide guidelines for their construction. 
In 1993, Washington passed a law increasing penalties for what is termed ‘malicious 
harassment’ based on the victim’s “real or perceived race, color, religion, ancestry, 
national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensory handicap.”107
                                                 
107 Washington State Law RCW 9A.36.080. 
 
In 2009, this was expanded to include protections for transgendered individuals and 
groups, or gender identity. The malicious harassment law is a unique, broadly constructed 
cornerstone-like measure addressing bias motivated acts that serves to cover a variety of 
crimes which range from physical injury or assault to property damage. The delivery of 
threatening messages to individuals or groups, and how this can be communicated 
through a variety of means is also covered, including special mention of the symbolic use 
of cross burnings and swastikas. The use of these two symbols on the property of an 
African-American or Jewish citizen, respectively, is taken as prima facie evidence of 
biased harassment or intimidation. This provision is similar to the prima facie element 
struck down in Virginia v. Black, but is saved constitutionally by stating that the use of 
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these symbols has to be clearly directed at an individual or a group. The Black law 
assumed that any cross burning was done with the intent of biased intimidation, and that 
was deemed overly broad.  
 Washington State has a law protecting places of worship from bombing and 
property damage which indirectly can be viewed as a bias crime law. It has also passed 
laws requiring law enforcement training in the area of bias or bigoted malicious 
harassment, a statute requiring data collection in relation to such crimes, and specific 
channels through which to seek civil restitution as a result of biased crime victimization. 
 Like Washington, the state of Minnesota has already been used as an example 
often in this piece, but a few more details might prove illuminative. Minnesota was the 
setting for the Supreme Court making clear that laws bordering on criminalizing hate 
speech would be deemed unconstitutional in R. A. V. As the St. Paul ordinance at issue in 
this case would imply, Minnesota was ahead of much of the country in constructing laws 
addressing bias motivated crimes. In 1989, laws were passed increasing penalties for 
physical assault, property damage, and harassment or intimidation based on race, color, 
religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability, age, or national origin. As was mentioned 
previously, Minnesota has also passed the various laws that accompany or compliment 
extensive bias crime penalization and broad group protection, such as those covering law 
enforcement training, civil redress, and data collection. 
 The passage of extensive legislation regarding bias or hate crime in Minnesota 
and Washington State was not done without any kind of opposition, but both states 
passed the basic laws and penalty enhancements quickly following the introduction of 
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bills into their legislatures. Seemingly, the more progressive and Democratic controlled 
political cultures of both states were receptive, or perhaps susceptible, to the immediacy 
surrounding hate crime that arose in the 1980s and 90s. This is exemplified by the 
findings attached to Washington State’s passage of their malicious harassment law which 
were quoted earlier in this piece. These findings essentially mirrored the tone of hate 
crime law advocates. As the research conducted for this project will later show, this 
emphasis on or concern regarding bias crime has particularly increased when viewing 
media in the State of Washington.  
The other two states profiled in this project’s content analysis, South Carolina and 
Wyoming, have had a much more complicated relationship with proposed bias crime 
legislation. The lack of ease with which such measures have found passage in these two 
states could be viewed as reflective of their respective political cultures. In looking at 
these next two states it is worth keeping in mind that there might be an expressive 
actualization or message inherent in not passing hate crime laws. The message sent by 
not passing legislation can perhaps be as effective for the opposition consensus of the 
Wyoming and South Carolina state legislatures, as the message imparted through passing 
laws can be for the legislature in states like Minnesota and Washington. 
 
South Carolina 
As was previously mentioned, the state of South Carolina has passed laws aimed 
at institutional vandalism which could be interpreted as means to address some acts of 
bias crime, but the state has passed no laws directly addressing the subject. In the mid-
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nineties there was a push spearheaded by then governor David Beasley largely as the 
result of some high profile bias crimes around that time.108 Through the latter part of the 
decade more progressive and moderate members of the South Carolina legislature 
continued attempts to pass a penalty enhancement provision for bias crimes to no avail. 
In keeping with the expressive nature of such legislation, sponsors of the bias crime bills 
seemed to be aware of the need to address the history of the state and that region of the 
country, as well as to join the rest of the nation in openly condemning hate crime. For 
example, a Democratic Representative named Doug Jennings, who cosponsored a hate 
crime bill in 1999, commented that South Carolina needed to pass the bill to show that 
they “frown upon that kind of crime in a more serious manner."109 He also added in 
reference to a penalty enhancement statute that “even Mississippi has one.”110
Interestingly, the debate over hate crime legislation coincided with political 
battles over the confederate flag’s prominence on the state capital. The two issues were 
often lumped together as a battle between traditionalist supporters of the political status 
quo in the South and those who wished to acknowledge problematic race relations in 
South Carolina’s history and take more of a progressive stance. Still, despite there being 
many members of the South Carolina legislature that were vehemently opposed to the 
passage of any form of bias crime legislation it may have been the inclusion of sexual 
orientation and gender as protected groups that was most objectionable to more 
conservative politicians. If the legislation had been limited to those groups most 
  
                                                 
108 Heilprin, John. “Beasley Order Carries No Weight” The Charleston Post and Courier, November 3, 
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109 Graves, Rachel. “Hate Crimes Bill Killed in House Committee” The Charleston Post and Courier, 
March 5, 1999.  
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conventionally included, like it was in many other more socially conservative states, it 
likely would have passed. 111 Throughout the last decade the push for bias crime 
legislation in South Carolina has effectively died off and in the most recent gubernatorial 
race both the Democratic and Republican candidates were opposed to pressing for or 
even supporting the creation of hate crime laws.112
  South Carolina is not alone in its resistance to hate crime legislation amongst 
southern states. Both Arkansas and Georgia also have, for all intents and purposes, no 
laws. This is not to imply that only southern state legislatures have remained resistant to 
the passing of bias crime laws. Many states in other regions have also passed few laws, 
and Wyoming and Indiana remain just as free of bias crime legislation as these three 
southern states. It is also worth pointing out that Florida and Louisiana have enacted 
relatively extensive hate crime measures, not just when compared to the South, but to the 
entire nation. Still, the South represents perhaps the most consistent pocket of opposition 
to bias crime legislation. To put this in perspective, Alabama, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, and Tennessee have passed penalty enhancements for some bias crime, but they 
join the three aforementioned southern states with no laws in not having mandated data 
collection or the law enforcement training which aids in making the enactment of 
legislation effective. Additionally, Virginia, Alabama, and Kentucky have not passed 
legislation covering gender. Finally, Alabama, Mississippi, North Carolina, Virginia, and 
 
                                                 
111 Heilprin, John. “Gay Rights Doomed Hate Crimes Bill.” The Charleston Post and Courier, July 20, 
1997.  
112 Behre, Robert. “Q & A with Nikki Haley and Vincent Sheheen” The Charleston Post and Courier, 
October 18, 2010. 
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West Virginia hate crime laws do not cover sexual orientation or gender identity.113
 Regretful treatment of minority groups has by no means been restricted to one 
particular area of the United States. However, fairly or unfairly, it is difficult not to have 
the southern states’ relative lack of bias crime legislation make an impression due to the 
overriding impression of its history. One can see this being referenced in the previous 
quote by the South Carolina Representative wishing to send a message through bias 
crime legislation about where the state currently stands in relation to its past, and being 
frustrated by another state (Mississippi) with a similarly bad historical reputation 
appearing more enlightened. 
 
Again, many other states share similar categorical gaps and do not cover training and data 
collection, but there is a noticeable concentration in the South. 
 The tumultuous history of the South in the area of minority treatment, and how 
this relates to the current political climate and its effects on the instituting, as well as the 
enforcement of hate crime legislation have previously been the focus of research. One of 
the most interesting pieces of research found that “contemporary hate crime policing and 
prosecution will be less vigorous where lynching was more prevalent prior to 1930.”114 
This project, involving all of the southern states mentioned above with the exception of 
Virginia and West Virginia, was conducted based on the notion that “racial antagonism 
tends to be deeply ingrained in culture” and that such antagonisms evolve and manifest 
themselves in different ways over time. 115
                                                 
113 http://www.adl.org/99hatecrime/state_hate_crime_laws.pdf 
 Subsequently, these cultural antagonisms have 
114 King, R. D., Messner, S. F., & Baller, R. D. (2009). Contemporary hate crimes, law enforcement, and 
the legacy of racial violence. American Sociological Review 74: 291-315. Pg. 291. 
115 Ibid. Pg. 292. 
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been stoked by bias crime legislation and evidenced through “contemporary era 
resistance to special legal protection for minorities.”116 The research in this article 
focused exclusively on the reporting and prosecution of hate crimes directed at racial and 
ethnic minorities, excluding other protected groups less historically relevant. Essentially, 
it looked at whether state and/or federal bias crime laws were being disproportionately 
ignored in southern states and concluded that “race relations have morphed from overt 
discrimination into skepticism about laws that assume a protective role for racial 
minorities.”117
 
 It seems this skepticism has not just led to the weak or nonexistent 
enforcement of bias crime measures, but can reasonably been seen as a roadblock to the 
passage of hate crime legislation in some southern states. Of course, while research 
linking lynching to bias crime legislation resistance highlights a fairly unique racial 
antagonism in the South, the states in this region are not the only ones who have resisted 
such laws. 
Wyoming 
 The State of Wyoming is one of the most intriguing states when it comes to the 
issue of bias crime legislation. This is due to its complete lack of bias or hate crime 
legislation being juxtaposed with it also being home to arguably the most prominent hate 
crime of the last fifteen years. In October of 1998 two young men murdered University of 
Wyoming Student Matthew Shepard by luring him from a lounge in Laramie by 
pretending to be gay themselves and acting disingenuously friendly. They then drove him 
                                                 
116 Ibid. Pg. 293. 
117 Ibid. Pg. 310. 
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to a secluded area outside of town, tied him to a fence post, beat him severely, and then 
left him there to die.118
    In the years preceding Matthew Shepard’s death, legislation had been 
introduced into the Wyoming state legislature seeking enhanced penalties for bias 
motivated crimes. This was first done in the early 90’s and attempts had been made 
throughout the decade resulting in little headway. Prior to the Shepard incident none of 
the bills had actually made their way to the floor for debate.
 The murder of Matthew Shepard received widespread national 
attention and this attention has carried long enough for his name to be attached to the 
most recent piece of federal hate crime legislation passed in 2009. 
119 However, following the 
local reaction and national attention brought on by such a brutally violent crime aimed at 
an individual based on their sexual orientation, bias crime legislation made considerably 
more progress in the legislature and it reached the floor for debate in 1999. Like in South 
Carolina, the bill supporters in the Wyoming legislature saw its passage as an important 
way to “send a message that crimes that put certain groups of people in fear would not be 
tolerated” both for the sake of the residents in the state and as a signal to the rest of the 
nation.120 Somewhat surprisingly, and also similar to the problems such legislation faced 
in South Carolina, it was protections for the gay and lesbian communities that were 
thought to be the major sticking point, even though the legislative momentum the hate 
crimes bill enjoyed was as a result of an attack based on sexual orientation.121
                                                 
118 Levin and McDevitt (2002). 
  
119 Miller, Jared. “State Avoids Hate Crime Legislation” Casper Star Tribune October 11, 2008. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
58 
 
 It may not be as pronounced as in the southern states, but the oppositional posture 
towards bias crime legislation and a lack of extensive group inclusion in the laws that do 
exist is not uncommon in the similarly Republican-driven political cultures that surround 
Wyoming in the non-coastal western half of the United States. For example, Montana, 
Idaho, South Dakota, and North Dakota do not include sexual orientation or gender 
identity as a protected categorization in their bias crime laws. Additionally, Colorado, 
Kansas, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Utah do not require or mandate data 
collection or law enforcement training.122 Still, the holes in bias crime legislation in this 
part of the country are not as consistent as in the South, and many states appear to be 
moving in the direction of increasing hate crime laws. Even in Wyoming the Democratic 
Party, though consistently the minority party in the state legislature, continues to push 
hate crime legislation as a major element of their platform.123 It is also perhaps a sign of 
movement in the direction of accepting some progressive policies that the Wyoming state 
senate recently refused to pass a bill which would have banned the recognition of out of 
state gay marriages.124 This is particularly true, when taking into account that the latest 
elections resulted in the largest Republican majority in ninety years and thus the 
legislature was expected be, and in many other areas was, decidedly conservative.125
 The brief profiles of these four states and their different paths or obstacles to the 
passing of bias crime legislation should serve to create a sense of what the media was 
covering over the periods of time observed in the following content analysis. This piece 
  
                                                 
122 http://www.adl.org/99hatecrime/state_hate_crime_laws.pdf 
123 Barron, John. “Don’t Forget the Party Platforms” Casper Star Tribune June 6, 2010.  
124 Pelzer, Jeremy. “Wyoming Senate Votes Down Anti-Gay Marriage Bill” Casper Star Tribune March 2, 
2011.  
125 Pelzer, Jeremy. “Wyoming Senate Kills Gay Marriage Bill” Casper Star Tribune March 3, 2011.  
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will now move on to a description of the methodology used in compiling data for the 
content analysis and then a presentation of the results. These results will be looked at 
according to each individual state and how they compare to one another.         
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Chapter 5: 
Methodology of Content Analysis  
The media’s role in issue visibility, and how this is possibly a reflection of a 
community’s view of bias crime and bias crime related issues, is where this project 
wishes to focus. An analysis of media content is valuable in understanding how hate or 
bias crimes and the resulting laws are perceived by the public, or even if they are visible 
to the public at all. Most importantly, it can serve to assess what effect the expressive 
element of bias crime legislation, and the consistently referenced goal of messaging 
through hate crime laws, actually has on the public. In assessing the results of bias crime 
legislation having been instituted, it is also of value to view states that have avoided the 
passing of such laws. Thus, this project’s research is aimed at two states with extensive 
hate crime laws (Minnesota and Washington) and two states with essentially none 
(Wyoming and South Carolina).  
A content analysis was conducted that involved counting the overall number of 
articles in each state’s highest circulation newspaper by searching for use of the phrase 
“hate crime” or “bias crime” for the period between 1997 and 2010 for all four states. 
The content analysis for the State of Washington’s largest paper The Seattle Times 
extends farther back to 1992. This was done in order to assess media coverage in the state 
immediately prior to the passage of bias crime legislation, thus creating a picture of how 
The Seattle Times has covered hate crime and bias crime related issues during the entire 
lifespan of such laws in Washington. Similarly, the content analysis of Minnesota’s 
largest newspaper, Minneapolis Star-Tribune, stretches back to 1989 as a means of 
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capturing media coverage since the instituting of bias crime laws. Articles appearing in 
South Carolina’s The Charleston Post and Courier are counted from 1995 on, which 
marks the beginning of the strongest, yet ultimately unsuccessful push to pass bias crime 
legislation. The content analysis of media in Wyoming is the only state in which two 
different papers are used. Beginning in 1997, this project utilizes the state’s second 
largest paper The Wyoming Tribune-Eagle since data for Wyoming’s largest paper 
Casper Star Tribune was not available beyond 2003. A time span for the state of 
Wyoming not encompassing the late 1990s and the murder of Matthew Shepard leaves 
out a considerably important hate crime story for that state and the legislative push for the 
passage of bias crime law that followed in its wake. This is why The Wyoming Tribune-
Eagle was added. The content analysis of The Wyoming Tribune-Eagle is carried out until 
2010, but the higher circulation Casper Star-Tribune is also used from 2003 to 2010 in 
order to garner a better sense of how the media has covered bias crime in Wyoming in the 
past decade. 
While none of the time periods covered for each state are identical, all of the time 
periods bear relation to one another. Comparing how local media handles hate or bias 
crime after it has been become an issue is made easiest by looking at varying time spans. 
This is because the most definitive point at which the media began to cover the issue of 
bias crime was when it worked its way into the state legislative agenda, where it either 
passed (Washington and Minnesota) or was defeated (South Carolina and Wyoming).   
The online archives for each paper were used along with a LexisNexus newspaper 
database. Articles were categorized according to whether or not they focused on a locally 
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oriented bias crime story, or on a bias crime related story from another state or at the 
national level. These articles included reports of possible hate crimes, hate crime charges 
and prosecutions, articles reporting on proposed legislation and any debate surrounding 
it, and opinion editorials, as well as the listing or basic description of community events 
addressing hate crime in some manner. Letters to the editor are not counted, nor are 
comments relating to articles which often appeared while searching online newspaper 
databases. Hate crime related material that appears in blogs is excluded since this 
material only appears online, and theoretically does not reach the full readership or 
circulation of the paper. The inclusion of blogs could distort results because they are a 
relatively recent addition to the tools used by news services and did not exist during 
many of the years covered in this analysis. Additionally, not every newspaper included in 
this research blogs selected news stories.  
Of course, the use of just one news publication does not create a complete 
statewide sample of all media, excludes a great deal of other print media, and perhaps 
does not account for some ideological differences that would most likely exist outside of 
the most populated regions of each state. However, this piece focused on a comparison 
between states, so looking at the largest outlet of local print media from each should 
provide a sufficient sample of variance at the level with which it is concerned.  
In both South Carolina and Wyoming it is expected that there should be a rise in 
articles related to hate or bias crime when the debate over legislation was most prominent 
and then a sharp decline in articles in subsequent years as the failure to pass legislation is 
reflected by little media attention. The results in Washington and Minnesota should be 
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more consistent, and the number of articles should be at least fairly steady if not 
increasing over time, the logic being that the passage of hate or bias crime legislation 
results in increased public or community awareness as the laws are applied to bias 
motivated crimes. This should then be reflected in, and is perhaps due to the amount of 
coverage media outlets devote to bias crime related stories. Much of this coverage will be 
based most clearly on the necessity in mentioning the bias motivated aspect of hate 
crimes as the existence of bias crime laws shape the prosecution of such crimes. 
However, the expected frequency of articles related to hate or bias crime in the states that 
have enacted bias crime legislation should not simply be the product of or contain content 
solely related to the reporting of individual hate crimes and their prosecution. 
Though some have argued that the cataloging of hate crimes at the federal and 
state level, and the highlighting of hate crimes in the media when they occur, could cause 
a divisive reaction,126 this project assumes differently. A frequent emphasis on hate 
crimes in highly circulated media should provide a signal to those groups who feel 
threatened by such crimes that the community on the whole shares their concern and the 
state is in the process of directly addressing ideologies that seek to marginalize them. 
Such an emphasis could also prove indicative of the communities that most readily have 
embraced bias crime legislation as a necessary measure. The media reports on it with 
frequency because the state and the public are concerned about eradicating these crimes 
and have accepted the categorization of bias or hate crimes as just that. Much in the same 
way media attention aids in the passage of laws,127
                                                 
126 Jacobs and Potter (1998). 
 coverage in the media would not 
127 Soule, S. A. & Earl, J. (2001). 
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result in condemnation of hate crime laws or divisiveness. Rather, it should accompany 
the acceptance of such measures, particularly as the public becomes more used to them. It 
is expected that the content analysis will fall in line with these assumptions. Coverage in 
Minnesota and Washington will be more frequent, as a reflection of the messaging effects 
of bias crime legislation. 
The articles will separate local and national, or out of state, coverage. It is 
important to count reprinted national stories, such as those found in the Associated Press 
and the New York Times. The reprinting of stories outside the state a newspaper operates 
within is perhaps an even stronger example of a community or public’s interest in 
emphasizing hate crime and bias crime issues. This can be seen as an indication that a 
newspaper sees as relevant even bias crimes that do not affect the community of their 
readership, or sees as important the federal level debate over legislation. Separating local 
and national articles will also help when comparing FBI hate crime statistics to media 
reporting of hate crime. For instance, disproportionate national attention is of note if there 
have been numerous reported crimes within a year in a region, but the stories that the 
local media has reported focus primarily on the debate over federal legislation in 
Congress or high profile hate crimes in other areas of the country. This might serve to 
make such hate or bias crimes look like a remote or irrelevant phenomenon in the state 
and community in which the newspaper operates.        
In addition to the content analysis, Federal Bureau of Investigation data between 
1996 and 2009 on reported hate crime incidents in each state is utilized to track any shift 
in numbers over this time period. With the exception of a brief increase around the turn 
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of the millennium, the total national number of hate crimes over this period of time has 
been essentially unmoved despite the adoption of various forms of bias crime legislation 
by a majority of states in the last two decades. 
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Figure 1- FBI Reported Hate Crimes in the United States 1996-2009 
A brief glance at the state level numbers to see if there is perhaps any noticeable 
correlation between a drop in reported hate crimes and the application of bias crime laws 
in Washington shows that this state seems to be following the overall national trend. 
There have been variances in Washington, but this does not indicate that the number of 
bias crimes is heading in a distinct direction. This is also true for the State of Wyoming, 
which reports a distinctly smaller number of hate crimes than the other three states. The 
numbers in Wyoming can most likely at least be partially explained by the relative 
66 
 
population size of the state. For much of the time period covered, the number of reported 
hate crimes in Minnesota was comparable to that of Washington but in recent years totals 
appear to be trending lower. The state that provides the most distinct trend between 1996 
and 2009 is South Carolina, which has seen a rise in reported bias crimes in recent years.   
Due to both the essentially consistent numbers in two of the states and an analysis 
of the effects of bias crime laws on overall numbers of reported crimes being outside the 
focus of this project, the FBI data will be primarily of value in observing how trends in 
the media’s handling of hate crime and hate crime issues line up with the number of 
crimes reported. Theoretically, if the attention paid by the media to hate or bias crime 
stories is proportional to the existence of such crimes, there should not be much of a shift 
in local coverage in Washington and Wyoming. In Minnesota the number of articles 
would drop with the reduced number of reported hate crimes and in South Carolina, there 
would be an increase in local coverage in roughly the last half-decade covered by this 
analysis. However, it is expected that this will not be the case. Due to the nonexistence of 
bias crime law in the State of South Carolina, the media will print few locally oriented 
stories involving hate crime, despite the increased reporting of such crime by local 
agencies. It is assumed that coverage will not be affected by the amount of total reported 
crimes in any of the four states. The amount of articles in Washington and Minnesota 
should be consistently greater in number than that in South Carolina and Wyoming, and 
that number should increase over time regardless of the amount hate crimes tallied in 
each state by the FBI.   
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Chapter 6: 
Results 
Washington 
 Of the four publications examined in this content analysis, the State of 
Washington’s highest circulation newspaper, The Seattle Times, devoted the most 
coverage to hate or bias crime and the issues surrounding it. From 1992 through 2010 the 
overall amount of articles in a given year never dropped below 12. This was the number 
of articles published relating to bias crime in 1995, which marked a lull in coverage for a 
few years in the mid to late nineties. The lull in this period followed the considerably 
more frequent coverage of 1992 and 1993. The higher totals over these two years can 
largely be credited to the lead up to, and subsequent passage of, Washington’s malicious 
harassment law. However, much of the overall number of articles related to bias crime in 
the 1990s was nationally focused, particularly in 1998 and 1999. Unsurprisingly, many of 
these stories were focused on the killings of Matthew Shepard and James Byrd. This had 
brought the attention of the entire country and led to a push by President Bill Clinton and 
some members of Congress to pass an expansion of federal hate crime legislation in 1999 
and 2000,128 which was highlighted by an attempt to expand categorization of protected 
groups to include sexual orientation.129
The amount of articles in The Seattle Times related to bias crime began to rise at 
the close of the nineties based on these prominent national stories and began reaching 
  
                                                 
128 “Murder Charges Filed in Death of Gay Student---Across Nation and in Wyoming, Calls Are Made For 
Stronger Hate Crime Laws.” Re-print from Associated Press October 13, 1998.  
129 Healy, Melissa. “House OK’s Expansion of Law on Hate Crime.” Re-print from Los Angeles Times 
September 14, 2000.  
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numbers similar to those seen in 1992 and 1993. This increase held into the first two 
years of the new millennium. By 2001, the push for increased federal hate crime 
legislation was effectively stalled by a new Republican administration and largely 
Republican Congress. Still, the level of stories focused on bias crime remained steady in 
2001 when the majority of the hate crime coverage shifted and was focused locally. 
Much of this local coverage involved bias motivated acts directed at Muslim immigrants 
from Central Asia following the World Trade Center attacks of September 11th. Most 
notably, there were a number of widely reported but unsuccessful attempts to damage or 
destroy mosques in Western Washington and a varied array of other types of harassment 
or assault.130 These crimes were subsequently prosecuted using either the federal penalty 
enhancement or the Washington state malicious harassment law.131
 After the high profile local attacks following September 11th the number of bias 
crime articles fell to around twenty for the next two years, which was still a higher yearly 
number than those found in the mid-1990s. The overall number climbed in 2004, dipped 
slightly in 2005, and then began a steady ascent through the rest of the decade. The climb 
in the overall number of articles was particularly profound between 2007 and 2010. 
Throughout the 2000’s, the amount of articles detailing local bias crimes or local stories 
surrounding the issues raised by hate crime remained considerable and was virtually on 
par with or more numerous than nationally focused articles with the exception of the last 
year in the analysis, 2010. 
 
                                                 
130 Ith, Ian & Birkland, David. “Hate Causes More Sorrow: Patrols at Mosques Follow Attacks.”  Seattle 
Times September 15, 2001. 
131 Seattle Times Staff. “Man Pleads Not Guilty to Hate Crime Charges.” Seattle Times September 29, 
2001. 
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Figure 2- Bias Crime Related Articles in The Seattle Times: 1992-2010 
The amount of local articles was considerably higher in 2008 and 2009. In large 
part, this was due to a single crime being prosecuted using the malicious harassment law. 
In 2006, a man named Naveed Haq entered the offices of the Jewish Federation of 
Greater Seattle and opened fire, killing one woman and injuring five others. This was 
reportedly carried out due to Haq’s hatred for the nation of Israel. Haq’s trial was 
conducted primarily over the course of 2008 and 2009 and it drew a very large amount of 
coverage. The articles covering the crime consistently invoked the term hate or bias crime 
in relation to his acts and subsequent charges. In addition to being found guilty of 
aggravated first degree murder for the one death, Haq was also found guilty on five 
counts of attempted first degree murder, and unlawful imprisonment. These charges were 
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then topped with Haq being found guilty of violating Washington’s malicious harassment 
law.132 Following the close of the Haq case, the number of local articles dropped 
considerably, but the overall number actually rose, as The Seattle Times ran 120 
nationally focused articles with at least some reference to hate or bias crime in 2010. 
 
Table 1- Local and National Articles in The Seattle Times: 1992-2010 
The amount of reported FBI bias crime incidents in Washington State has shown 
some fluctuation between 1996 and 2009. The number has ranged from a high of 278 in 
2001 to a low of 171 in 2005. On average there have been 209 bias crimes reported a year 
in Washington. On the whole, the numbers have been fairly level over the decade and a 
half covered by the FBI statistics, with the exception of a small rise between 1998 and 
2001, followed by a subsequent small decline. There is no clear indication that the 
variance in the amount of articles over the years has a relationship to the total number of 
reported crimes. The number of articles did rise in the period between 1998 and 2001, but 
the majority of articles most of those years, with the exception of 2001 were focused on 
national stories related to bias crime. Perhaps most notably, the significant rise in the 
number of bias crime articles in The Seattle Times between 2006 and 2009 is not matched 
by a similar rise in FBI reported incidents. Also of note is the percentage of overall crime 
that bias crimes comprise. At no time in the fourteen years of data compiled by the FBI 
                                                 
132 Sullivan, Jennifer & Miletich, Steve. “Haq Convicted on All Counts in Jewish Federation Shootings.” 
Seattle Times December 15, 2009.  
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did the amount of bias crime account for even 0.001 percent of total crime. To put this 
more in perspective, on average between 1996 and 2009, one in every 1510 crimes133
                                                 
133 This includes violent and property crimes as compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation found at: 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr. Accessed on April 6, 2011. 
 that 
were committed in the state of Washington were reported as a hate crime to the FBI. 
Therefore, it is likely that the fluctuation that did occur in incidents would be difficult to 
detect unless looking at the actual numbers. Ultimately, it does not appear as though the 
total number of bias crime articles is an indication of the amount of bias crimes being 
committed according to FBI statistics. As has been emphasized, high profile hate crimes 
(the post 9/11 mosque attacks and the Haq case) seem to be a better predictor of greater 
media coverage in the case of the State of Washington and The Seattle Times. Although, 
even excluding these ‘triggering’ crimes coverage of bias or hate crime and related 
stories was the most prominent in this newspaper. 
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Figure 3- FBI Reported Hate Crimes in the State of Washington: 1996-2009 
 
Minnesota 
 Data collected for the State of Minnesota runs from 1989 to 2010, which is the 
largest span of time covered in this content analysis. Out of the twenty-two years 
covered, 2008 and 2009 yielded the highest number of articles relating to hate or bias 
crime, both with a total of twenty-eight articles. The initial years of the 1990s saw a rise 
in bias crime related coverage in conjunction with newly passed legislation at the state 
level. Like the State of Washington this was then followed by a dip in coverage in the 
mid to late nineties, reaching a low of three articles in 1995. The amount of coverage in 
Minneapolis Star-Tribune increased in 1998 and has remained fairly steady at totals in 
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the teens with the exception of the aforementioned increase in 2008 and 2009. The basic 
pattern of coverage in Minneapolis Star-Tribune resembles that of Washington and The 
Seattle Times with increased coverage around the passage of legislation, a subsequent 
drop of in the in the amount of articles followed by an increase in the late 90s and early 
2000s which held fairly consistent until an rise in recent years. Although, the recent 
increases in the total amount of articles in Minneapolis Star-Tribune are not nearly as 
dramatic as those seen in The Seattle Times. 
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Figure 4- Bias Crime Related Articles in Minneapolis Star-Tribune: 1989-2010 
For the most part, the articles produce by Minneapolis Star-Tribune have been 
local in nature over the last twenty-two years, but the share of articles that fall under the 
out of state or national categorization has grown in the last three years. Prior to these 
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recent years the largest amount of national level articles was in 1998, again primarily due 
to coverage of the high profile out of state hate crimes targeting James Byrd and Matthew 
Shepard. The recent increase has largely been largely the result of coverage focusing on 
the previously mentioned recent push of the federal hate crime act named after Byrd and 
Shepard and its subsequent passage. This is true particularly as it relates to 2009 when the 
amount of national articles matching the number of local articles produced by 
Minneapolis Star-Tribune. There was no local crime of a particularly sensational 
character in all the years covered of Minnesota that rivaled that of the Haq case in 
Washington. So the majority of local articles detailed relatively minor bias crime 
offences, as well as the describing and listing of events aimed at encouraging awareness 
and discussion of hate crime. 
  
Table 2- Local and National Articles in Minneapolis Star-Tribune: 1989-2010 
The reported incidents of hate or bias crime in Minnesota in the span of 1996 to 
2009 have ranged from a high of 268 in 1996 to a low of 137 in 2006, showing a larger 
amount of fluctuation than Washington. The average over this span of fourteen years is 
201, which is not far from the number in Washington. However, the amount of reported 
bias crimes accounted for a consistently lower amount on average over the last four years 
of FBI compiled statistics, landing at an average of about 150 incidents per year. 
Minnesota is the only state in this analysis that has an amount of hate crime that reaches 
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0.001 percent of total crime, which was the case in eleven of the fourteen years. This 
translates to an average of one in every 908 crimes being categorized as a bias crime. 
While this total is notable in a statistical sense when compared to the other three states, it 
seemingly would make little difference in public perception of bias crime frequency since 
the amount of bias crime relative to the overall total is still very small, even if bias crime 
accounts for a noticeably greater amount than it does in the three other states. 
Additionally, due to their trending in opposite directions, it does not appear as though the 
number of bias crimes in Minnesota aligns in any significant way with the total number 
of articles in Minneapolis Star-Tribune. 
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Figure 5- FBI Reported Hate Crimes in the State of Minnesota: 1996-2009 
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Perhaps the most notable aspect of the numbers compiled for Minnesota is that 
despite the shifts in the overall number of articles in Minneapolis Star-Tribune aligning 
to a certain extent with those found in The Seattle Times, the amount of articles was 
consistently lower. At the same time during much of the period covered by both the 
Washington and Minnesota content analysis the amount of reported hate crimes was 
comparable. This presents a bit of a surprise, even if the coverage in Minnesota is greater 
than the other two states in this analysis questions still arise as to why the amount of 
attention paid to bias crime related stories is far less in Minneapolis Star-Tribune than 
The Seattle Times.   
 
South Carolina 
 The most limited amount of coverage of bias crime and issues surrounding bias 
crime was represented by The Charleston Post and Courier, South Carolina’s largest 
newspaper. The amount of articles written in a given year, between 1995 and 2010, never 
rose above that of 14 in 1996. The peak period, so to speak, of bias crime related articles 
ran from 1996 to 1999. These are the years when the possibility of a bias crime statute 
passing in the state legislature looked most likely. At first it appeared as though a 
uniquely local character was evident in the articles during this period of time in that only 
one out of forty was focused on a national or out of state bias crime story. However, the 
amount of coverage of national stories remained low throughout the time covered in this 
analysis and accounted for only three in all sixteen years. It appears that the Post and 
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Courier did not feel inclined to seek articles about hate crime from the national scene 
whether or not there were relevant local stories. 
 
Table 3- Local and National Articles in The Charleston Post and Courier: 1995-2010 
The overall lack of bias crime articles hit a low of none in 2006, which was 
preceded by only one for both 2004 and 2005. These numbers picked up in the latter part 
of the decade, returning to numbers close to those seen during the debate over bias crime 
legislation at the state level. These more recent articles focus almost exclusively on local 
incidents or crimes, since the debate regarding possible legislation at the state level has 
effectively been brushed aside for approximately a decade. The reference to bias crime 
found in these articles is generally in the quotes of victims or groups who are labeling an 
incident as a hate crime and expressing an unfavorable view of South Carolina having no 
bias crime legislation, which is then confirmed by the author.134
                                                 
134 Parker, Adam. “Mom Urges Hate Crime Law in S.C.” Charleston Post and Courier May, 27, 2007.  
 This kind of articles 
provides an example of what would logically lead to a state with no bias crime laws have 
a smaller level of media coverage referencing bias crime. Since the state does not 
prosecute bias crimes as such it becomes likely that they will be reported as simply 
assaults or vandalism unless a victim, or an advocate for a victim, attempts to label a 
crime as being bias motivated. When a basic report of an incident simply addresses the 
arrest and prosecution of a crime in a state with no hate crime laws, it is far less likely to 
Parker, Adam. “Three Cleared in Cross Burning.” Charleston Post and Courier October 18, 2008.                                            
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be labeled a hate crime. This can perhaps be best illustrated by comparing the amount of 
articles in the Post and Courier with the number of hate crimes in South Carolina 
according to the FBI.  
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Figure 6- Bias Crime Related Articles in The Charleston Post and Courier: 1995-2010 
The range in reported hate crime incidents spans from 33 in 2000 to 153 in 2008. 
The majority of the lower totals occurred between 1996 and 2003, when the average 
amount of reported hate crimes was 57. From 2004 to 2009, that number proceeded to 
jump to an average of about 120, or over double the amount of the previous eight years. 
2004 is the same year that the number of bias crime related articles in the Post and 
Courier dropped to one, was followed by one in 2005, and dropped to none in 2006. 
During the first few years of a fairly steep rise in reported bias crime incidents, bias crime 
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related articles were virtually nonexistent. The total number of articles picked up slightly 
between 2007 and 2010 but were still nowhere near as numerous as the amount of bias 
crimes articles in Minnesota, and especially Washington. The total of bias or hate crimes 
in South Carolina were reaching a level comparable to Minnesota’s, and far closer to 
Washington’s than it had been in the past, but there were few articles detailing bias crime 
incidents or issues. For example, in 2009 there was one local article for every 21 bias 
crimes in The Charleston Post and Courier, in Minneapolis Star-Tribune there was one 
local article for every 11 crimes, and in The Seattle Times there was one local article for 
every 3 crimes. Such an outcome is understandable when bias crimes are not charged 
with that label and thus are far less likely to be reported on by the media as bias or hate 
crimes. Seemingly, this would also imply that there is less public awareness. 
80 
 
State of South Carolina
42
71
94
52
33
41
70
54
105
98
110
127
153
124
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1996-2009
FBI Reported Hate Crimes
  
Figure 7- FBI Reported Hate Crimes in the State of South Carolina: 1996-2009 
It should be acknowledged that the reporting of hate crime incidents in states that 
have not passed data collection legislation can be less accurate than the data coming from 
those states that have such a statute.135 As was previously mentioned, there is research 
that points to underreporting of hate crime in states like South Carolina who have a 
history of racial turbulence.136
                                                 
135 Levin and McDevitt (2002). 
 Due to this, even if South Carolina’s number cannot be 
taken entirely for granted, it should not negate the previous point regarding the incredibly 
disproportionate amount of articles when compared to the amount of reported bias 
motivated crimes in South Carolina, and how the underreporting is perhaps to be 
136 King, R. D., Messner, S. F., & Baller, R. D. (2009).   
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expected when no charges can be filed. As both Washington and Minnesota show, overall 
numbers rising or dropping do not predict a comparable rise or drop in articles, but it is 
still of note that the number of articles in the Post and Courier is decidedly lower than 
that of the other two states’ largest papers when the amount of crime they encountered 
was similar in the latter part of the last decade. 
 
Wyoming 
 Most of the time period covered in the content analysis of articles in The 
Wyoming Tribune-Eagle finds that this paper had similar coverage of bias crime to that of 
The Charleston Post and Courier, the major exception to this being the years 1998 and 
1999. These two years saw The Wyoming Tribune-Eagle print 32 and 50 articles 
respectively that mentioned hate or bias crime. The rest of the time covered saw an 
average of 4.4 articles a year, a number much more in line with that found in South 
Carolina. For example, in both 2004 and 2005 there was just one article to be counted 
each year.  
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Figure 8- Bias Crime Related Articles in The Wyoming Tribune-Eagle: 1997-2010 
Why there was a spike seen in 1998 and 1999 can in some part be owed to a 
common factor found in all four states. Over these two years, and particularly in 1999, 
bias crime legislation was introduced and considered by the state legislature. However, 
adding to the number of articles around this time was one of the largest ‘triggering’ hate 
crimes to take place in the entire United States over the last twenty years. The widely 
covered murder of Matthew Shepard is what prompted this push for hate crime 
legislation in 1998 and 1999. The prominence of the Shepard murder ensured that 
coverage of bias or hate crime issues would be considerably high, and would far exceed 
the jump seen in The Charleston Post and Courier when the State of South Carolina was 
considering bias crime legislation. Still, the Wyoming legislature rejected bias crime 
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legislation in 1999 and its lack of consideration since137 perhaps ensured low numbers in 
subsequent years in The Wyoming Tribune-Eagle, numbers that were on par with those 
found in South Carolina. Notably, there was an increase in 2003 owed largely to that year 
marking the fifth anniversary of Shepard’s death, a subject that accounted for half the 
articles. Notably, the overall percentage of articles in The Wyoming Tribune-Eagle 
referencing Matthew Shepard between 1997 and 2010 was actually slightly higher than 
this landing at 53 percent. 
  
Table 4-Local and National Articles in The Wyoming Tribune-Eagle: 1997-2010 
The data collected from Casper Star-Tribune is of a markedly different character 
than much of what was found in The Wyoming Tribune-Eagle and certainly the data from 
The Charleston Post and Courier. Again, in large part this can be attributed to Wyoming 
being the setting for the murder of Matthew Shepard. Even though data was compiled 
starting in 2003, nearly five years after Shepard’s death, a great deal of the coverage 
relating to bias crimes was focused on that particular hate crime and its fallout. Between 
2003 and 2010 there were well over 100 articles in Casper Star-Tribune focused on the 
Matthew Shepard case, though not all of these were used in this content analysis due to 
many making no direct mention of bias or hate crime.  
                                                 
137 Lowell, Jessica. “Bias-Crime Bill Dropped Before Session Begins.” The Wyoming Tribune-Eagle 
February, 16 2000. Sec. A1.  
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Figure 9- Bias Crime Related Articles in Casper Star-Tribune: 2003-2010 
Between 2003 and 2010 the number of bias crime related articles in Casper Star-
Tribune was far less than the amount run by The Seattle Times, and it did not quite reach 
the same number of overall articles run by Minneapolis Star-Tribune. However, it was 
generally far more engaged with the issue of hate or bias crime than The Wyoming 
Tribune-Eagle and South Carolina’s The Charleston Post and Courier, publishing 106 
articles to the Tribune-Eagle’s 28 and the Post and Courier’s 35 in the years spanning 
2003 to 2010. The number of articles fluctuated slightly for Wyoming’s biggest paper. 
The total peaked at eighteen in 2006, never dropped below nine in a given year, and the 
split between locally focused and nationally or out of state centered articles was fairly 
balanced overall, at 64 and 42 respectively. While the amount of space dedicated to 
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Matthew Shepard related articles remained high throughout the time period examined, it 
reached its height in the years between 2007 and 2009. This was due to coverage of the 
first attempt by Congress to pass the Matthew Shepard Hate Crime Prevention Act in 
2007, followed by the tenth anniversary of his death in 2008, and subsequently the 
passage of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crime Prevention Act in 
2009.138 
 
Table 5- Local and National Articles in Casper Star-Tribune: 2003-2010 
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the coverage seen in Casper Star-Tribune is 
how it relates to the actual amount of bias crime incidents shown in FBI statistics. 
Naturally, the rate of bias or hate crime would be expected to be lower in a low 
population state, as the number of total crime would be. Indeed, the total number of bias 
crime incidents in Wyoming is decidedly smaller than the three other states. Between 
1996 and 2009 it has never been reported as higher than 21 in 2007 and has been as low 
as 2 in 1999. The average over this span of time has been 7 incidents a year. Such a low 
number of incidents makes the relative amount of coverage stand out, and adds further 
evidence to the notion that the overall amount of bias crime in a state does not accurately 
                                                 
138 “Wyoming Senators Oppose Hate Crimes Measure.” Re-print from Associated Press September 28, 
2007. 
    Gray, Kristy. “Tenth Anniversary of Shepard Murder Puts Focus Back on Wyoming, Laramie.” Casper 
Star-Tribune October 11, 2008. 
    Pelzer, Jeremy. “Civil Rights Leaders Praise Matthew Shepard Hate Crime Prevention Act.” Casper 
Star-Tribune October 28, 2009. 
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predict media coverage. For example, in 1999 The Wyoming Tribune-Eagle ran one 
article for every 0.04 bias crimes. Further, if using 2009 to calculate a ratio of articles to 
crimes, as was done previously with the three other states, Casper Star-Tribune ran one 
local bias crime related article for every 0.8 bias crime incidents in the state. Needless to 
say, the analysis of Wyoming’s largest newspaper painted a much different picture of the 
media’s approach to bias or hate crime in that state than was expected.139
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Figure 10- FBI Reported Hate Crime in the State of Wyoming: 1996-2009 
 
                                                 
139 The same caution should be taken when observing the FBI statistics for Wyoming incidents as was 
suggested regarding South Carolina’s numbers. However, it should be kept in mind that historical racial 
turbulence does not bare the same relevance to Wyoming. Therefore, while many in Wyoming may be 
resistant to bias legislation they are less perhaps less likely to avoid the acknowledgment of crimes aimed at 
minorities because of that status. 
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Chapter 7: 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 The results of this content analysis in many ways align with the assumptions put 
forth prior to it being conducted. The overall amount of articles was higher and more 
consistent in both Washington and Minnesota, the two states that have passed extensive 
bias crime legislation. Additionally, the amount of articles printed in The Seattle Times 
and Minneapolis Star-Tribune has increased over time and seems to be holding at higher 
numbers in the last decade. Despite common trends there is a noticeable difference in the 
amount of articles found in Washington and Minnesota. This is particularly of note due to 
the comparable character of their bias crime laws and a similar total of reported hate 
crimes occurring in each state. Due to such similarities, one might expect the total 
number of articles in each state’s largest newspaper to come much closer to matching. 
However, one reasonable explanation for such a difference is perhaps found in a greater 
amount of high profile hate crime cases occurring in the State of Washington. For 
example, a good deal of the increase in articles published by The Seattle Times in the last 
half decade can be owed to the aforementioned Haq case. The importance of high profile 
or ‘triggering’ bias crimes in predicting media attention does not completely explain the 
differences between Washington and Minnesota, but does provide some explanation, and 
also helps illuminate the surprising results found in Wyoming.    
 South Carolina also fell largely in line with some basic assumptions due to The 
Charleston Post and Courier not running many bias crime related articles between 1995 
and 2010. Wyoming, however, provided some unexpected results. The amount of 
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coverage was much higher than expected before the content analysis was conducted. 
Again, a notable feature of the coverage in both Wyoming newspapers was the amount 
related to the murder of Matthew Shepard, in both local and national articles. The total 
number of articles in The Wyoming Eagle-Tribune that make mention of Shepard account 
for 53 percent of stories, and in Casper Star-Tribune such articles account for 50 percent 
of the overall total. Seemingly, the death of Shepard, its fallout, and the national attention 
it received, which culminated in the passage of federal legislation bearing his name, 
could have trumped the factors that would have led to results more in line with those 
displayed in South Carolina. Still, while the largest paper, Casper Star-Tribune, has 
continued to provide a fair amount of bias crime articles over the last decade, The 
Wyoming Tribune-Eagle’s coverage fell of to a level basically on par with The 
Charleston Post and Courier despite a burst of Matthew Shepard related stories at the 
close of the 1990s.   
 The surprising numbers seen in Wyoming also point to the seeming lack of 
predictive power to be found when comparing the reported bias crime incidents compiled 
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the amount of coverage bias crimes receive. 
In a very basic sense there appears to be no distinct correlation between a rise, or fall, in 
the number of articles printed by any of the four papers and a rise or fall in reported 
incidents reported by the FBI. Of course, even if there were a seeming correlation 
between these two elements, any real conclusions regarding their relationship would 
require a thorough statistical analysis controlling for factors not touched on in this piece. 
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That being said, the amount of coverage devoted to bias crime issues in a given 
state appears to be a function more of a general approach to reporting on bias crime or the 
presence of a particularly high profile hate crime, rather than it being a function of overall 
bias crime numbers. For example, The Seattle Times saw a jump in coverage in the past 
half decade seemingly due to simply finding such stories relevant, and more specifically 
the high profile crime committed by Naveed Haq and the move toward passage of federal 
legislation. The overall number of crimes in Washington did not significantly increase 
over this period of time. Also, as reported incidents increased over the past two decades 
in South Carolina, The Charleston Post and Courier actually went through a period of 
reporting virtually none and then for a year literally not one article. Finally, coverage in 
The Wyoming Tribune-Eagle and Casper Star-Tribune was driven largely by one case in 
particular, and far outweighed the amount of reported bias crime incidents.   
Most relevant to the initial questions posed by this project, The Seattle Times and 
Minneapolis Star-Tribune provide some evidence that in a state with extensive bias crime 
law, the coverage highlighting bias crime is more consistent and increases over time. In 
Washington State, high profile crimes may have occurred, but did not account for nearly 
as much of the media coverage of bias crime as one crime did in Wyoming. While not 
conclusively providing evidence that these are phenomena resulting from the passage of 
bias crime legislation, it does on the surface appear as though the some of the desired 
expressive effects put forth by advocates have occurred in Washington and Minnesota 
regardless. 
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 On the other hand, The Charleston Post and Courier in South Carolina has largely 
avoided covering bias crime related stories. As was previously mentioned, this could 
have much to do with the lack of bias crimes being labeled bias crimes because they 
cannot and will not be prosecuted as such. This outcome is occurring despite the FBI 
reported amount of bias crimes not being far from the two states that consistently 
displayed the most media coverage. The lack of bias crime laws in South Carolina 
appears to limit the amount of attention paid by the media to acts motivated by the hatred 
of individuals or groups based on their descriptive characteristics. Therefore it does not 
seem unreasonable to assume that a similar perspective or lack of attention is paid by the 
public in general, which would describe the kind of societal view of passivity or 
indifference relating to hate crimes that bias crime legislation advocates seek to remedy. 
Still, the differences in the attention paid by the largest papers in the State of 
Washington and the State of Minnesota especially in recent years provides evidence that 
a comparable passage of bias crime laws does not guarantee the same amount of media 
coverage. This along with the unexpectedly large amount of coverage in Wyoming in the 
last decade and a half points to the conclusion that the expressive goals of bias crime 
legislation, when assessed through the media, are certainly not solely predicted through 
the passage of legislation.   
 
Conclusion 
 Since states first began to address ‘hate crime’ in the 1980s by passing legislation 
directly aimed at this previously existing yet not widely labeled form of crime, the 
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eradication of bias motivated incidents was by no means the sole objective of the laws. 
Instead advocates for the implementation of hate crime laws saw the need to send a 
message to communities, both those victimized by such crimes and the community at 
large, as equally important. Confronting ideological motivations behind a plethora of 
different forms of crime was seen as vital to assuring various long targeted and frequently 
marginalized populations that the government and their communities found these 
ideologies unacceptable. Bias crime laws are meant to express to these populations and 
individual victims that the justice system is properly addressing such crimes even if they 
exist. Beyond the general wish for an even more cohesive and genuinely equitable society 
following the successes of various rights movements in the 1960s and 70s, messaging of 
this nature can help avoid retaliatory actions and vigilantism on the part of an initially 
victimized group or individual.  
The importance of the messaging or ‘expressive’ goals and outcomes related to 
bias crime legislation has perhaps been thrown into greater relief as the number of FBI 
categorized hate crimes has held fairly steady since statistics were first collected in the 
1990s. It is difficult to point to any clear instrumental success with the passage of bias 
crime legislation at the national or state level. Thus, it appears as though there might 
always be a small amount of bias crime behind which lies ideologies that will entail the 
targeting of victims based on their descriptive characteristics.  
As this piece touched on earlier, advocates for hate crime laws have been, by and 
large, more successful than their opponents. It does not appear as though this form of law 
will be reversed or removed to any great extent in the coming years. Still, as with any 
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form of policy, it is of value to be able to clearly assess if bias crime legislation is having 
the effect it was put in place to realize. Since the instrumental effects of bias crime laws 
are difficult to find or appear neutral, how then do we measure how successful the more 
expressive goals of bias crime legislation have been?  
This project attempted to at least find an avenue for such measurement by looking 
at variations in how frequently some of the largest local level newspapers in four 
different states reported on bias or hate crime related issues; the theory being that if bias 
crime legislation advocates want a community to pay attention, be concerned, and 
ultimately condemn hate crimes in support of victimized groups, local media would need 
to highlight bias crime and the issues that surround it. Therefore, the success of 
government messaging inherent in bias crime laws should be reflected, and perhaps 
measurable, within local media. 
Some results were as expected. Media coverage was generally greater in the states 
(Washington and Minnesota) with extensive bias crime legislation, and lower in those 
with virtually none (South Carolina and Wyoming). It also increased over time in the two 
states with more hate crime laws after those laws had been passed. In South Carolina and 
Wyoming there was a burst of reporting when their respective state legislatures were 
toying with the notion of passing bias crime legislation, but coverage faded greatly in 
South Carolina in the years after the issue was dropped. This was not so much the case in 
Wyoming. Yet, those surprising totals where greatly skewed when the most high profile 
United States hate crime of the last two decades took place within that state. 
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This project perhaps only scratches the surface of what could be found by taking a 
similar approach on a much larger scale. For example, one might collect data for the 
entirety, or a least a larger sampling, of each state’s print media. This would likely help in 
creating a more detailed picture of how each state has reacted to bias crime legislation. It 
would also perhaps be of value to collect a larger and even more varied sampling of 
states, and see what effect the different gradations of laws passed amongst these states 
might have had on variations in how bias crime is covered by their media. While this 
piece addresses factors beyond simply the passage of bias crime legislation that might 
affect media coverage (crime rates, more sensational crimes, minority history, etc.) a 
statistical analysis that accounted for such controls would perhaps yield more satisfying 
results. In this same vein further research should account for the variables such as 
publication readership totals, the population of states used in the research, and the relative 
homogeneity of the populations. A content analysis along the lines such as the one 
conducted for this thesis perhaps only begins to address questions regarding the 
expressive effects of bias crime legislation. However, the path taken appears as though it 
could reveal much valuable information if traveled further.  
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